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ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP AND
THE FCC
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO*
ABSTRACT
Most First Amendment analyses of U.S. media policy have focused
predominantly on “behavioral” regulation, which either prohibits the
transmission of disfavored content (such as indecent programming) or
mandates the dissemination of preferred content (such as children’s
educational programming and political speech). In so doing, commentators
have largely overlooked how program content is also affected by
“structural” regulation, which focuses primarily on increasing the
economic competitiveness of media industries. In this Article, Professor
Christopher Yoo employs economic analysis to demonstrate how structural
regulation can constitute a form of “architectural censorship” that has the
unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of
media content. The specific examples analyzed include (1) efforts to foster
and preserve free television and radio, (2) rate regulation of cable
television, (3) horizontal restrictions on the number of outlets one entity
can own in a local market, and (4) regulations limiting vertical integration
in television and radio. Unfortunately, current First Amendment doctrine
effectively immunizes architectural censorship from meaningful
constitutional scrutiny, and it appears unlikely that existing doctrine will
change or that Congress or the Federal Communications Commission will
step in to fill the void.
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. This Article benefited from questions by
participants at the Conference on Federal Regulation and the Cultural Landscape, sponsored by the
Curb Center for Art, Enterprise, and Public Policy at Vanderbilt University, as well as the 32nd Annual
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference. I am also grateful to Stuart Benjamin, Owen Fiss,
Jonathan Levy, Richard Nagareda, Robert Pepper, and Bob Rasmussen for their comments on earlier
drafts, and Kate Albers and Paul Werner for their expert research assistance. I would like to offer
special thanks to my friend, Ed Baker, for his willingness to engage in the lively and constructive
intellectual exchange about my ideas appearing in this Article. I can offer no higher praise than to say
that I have spent much of my career inspired by and responding to his work.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent events have suddenly turned the media ownership regulations
promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) into a
hot topic. In 2001 and 2002, a remarkable series of decisions by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated significant portions of the
FCC’s media ownership restrictions.1 Moreover, the reasoning of the
opinions, which at times chided the FCC for failing to honor its statutory
obligation to “repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer
in the public interest,”2 casts doubt on the validity of a number of the
FCC’s other media ownership provisions. With its regulatory scheme
thrown into disarray, the FCC undertook its most comprehensive
reexamination of media ownership regulations in decades, which resulted
in a mammoth order that loosened many of the most prominent
restrictions.3
The prospect of widespread media consolidation touched off a
political firestorm.4 Congress responded by enacting legislation partially
scaling back the most salient of the FCC’s regulatory changes.5 Numerous
1. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162–64 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (invalidating
the FCC’s rule restricting ownership of more than one television station in any local market); Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.) (invalidating the FCC’s rules limiting the
number of television stations one entity can own nationally and prohibiting joint ownership of a
television station and local cable operator in the same city), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (invalidating the FCC’s rule
limiting the number of cable subscribers one entity can reach nationwide).
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111–12. The
scope of this statutory mandate has generated substantial controversy. The D.C. Circuit initially
interpreted section 202(h) as erecting “a presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the ownership
rules.” Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1048. See also Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 159
(citing with approval the quoted language from Fox Television Stations). Subsequent decisions have
been somewhat more circumspect. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 394, 423 (3d
Cir. 2004) (rejecting the idea that section 202(h) serves as a “one-way ratchet”); Cellco P’ship v. FCC,
357 F.3d 88, 97–98 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concluding that Fox Television Stations and Sinclair
Broadcasting Group left open whether section 202(h) created a presumption in favor of eliminating
existing regulations).
3. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) [hereinafter 2003
Biennial Review Order].
4. See, e.g., Ben Scott, The Politics and Policy of Media Ownership, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 645
(2004) (reviewing the political controversies surrounding the FCC’s media ownership decision).
5. Consolidated Appropriation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100
(scaling back the FCC’s decision to liberalize the number of television stations one entity could own
nationwide). For further discussion, see infra note 171 and accompanying text.
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parties challenged the FCC’s actions in court, some contending that the
amendments were too sweeping and others arguing that they did not go far
enough. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stayed, and
ultimately invalidated, the FCC’s order.6 These decisions gave the FCC
precious little guidance regarding the types of changes that will be
necessary in order for the media ownership regulations to survive judicial
review. The resulting uncertainty threatens to undermine forthcoming
mergers whose legality depend on the less restrictive limits that the FCC
sought to impose. What will happen next is anyone’s guess.
Although the bulk of the commentary on these events has focused on
the relative merits of the FCC’s actions and the court’s decision to strike
them down, I would like to analyze these events from a somewhat broader
perspective. What I find most interesting are the specific grounds invoked
by the courts to invalidate the media ownership rules. In most instances, the
courts based their actions on principles of administrative law while largely
rejecting challenges based on the First Amendment.7 The failure of these
challenges is consistent with the conventional wisdom concerning the
constitutionality of ownership restrictions. It has long been recognized that
measures directly regulating the behavior of media speakers—either by
prohibiting the transmission of disfavored content, such as indecent
programming,8 or by mandating the dissemination of preferred content,
such as children’s educational programming and political speech9—raise
serious First Amendment problems. Ownership restrictions and other forms
of structural regulation are generally thought to pose fewer constitutional
concerns.10 Consequently, although the constitutionality of behavioral
6. See Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 372 (remanding portions of the order), petition
for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2005) (Nos. 04-1020 & 04-1036), and 73 U.S.L.W.
3466 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2005) (Nos. 04-1033 & 04-1045); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388,
2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (staying the FCC’s media ownership order).
7. See Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 401–02; Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 167–
69; Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1045–47. For notable exceptions, see infra notes 79, 165, 283
and accompanying text.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000).
9. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303b(a)(2), 335(b)(1) (requiring broadcasters to offer children’s
educational programming); id. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (requiring broadcasters to provide access to political
candidates).
10. See, e.g., Am. Family Ass’n v. FCC, 365 F.3d 1156, 1168–69 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Ruggiero v.
FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc); Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 167–68; Fox
Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1046; Leflore Broad. Co. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 454, 458 n.26 (D.C. Cir.
1980); David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the “New Media”—New Directions in Regulating
Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 212 (1979); Timothy G. Gauger, Comment, The
Constitutionality of the FCC’s Use of Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcast Licenses, 83 NW. U.
L. REV. 665, 673 (1989).
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regulation has been the subject of extensive academic commentary, the
constitutionality of structural regulation has received considerably less
attention.11 A complete analysis of the impact of structural regulation on
program content has yet to appear in the literature.
This Article seeks to move beyond those previous analyses by offering
a more comprehensive discussion of the ways that structural regulation
affects media content. Part I explores a series of examples in which
structural regulation has had a dramatic influence on the content of speech.
The specific examples include: (1) efforts to foster free television over pay
television, (2) rate regulation of cable television, (3) restrictions on the
number of media outlets one entity can own in any media market, and (4)
regulations limiting vertical integration in television and radio. Each of
these examples was enacted to further three interests that the Supreme
Court has determined to be unrelated to the content of expression: the
preservation of free, local broadcasting; the promotion of competition; and
the need to foster a diversity of sources and viewpoints.12
Each case demonstrates how structural regulation can have unintended
effects on media content. Not only do these structural regulations tend to
reduce the overall quantity and quality of media programming, they also
11. One analysis focused on the relatively narrow issue of whether particular structural
regulations were enacted out of conscious effort to promote a diversity of viewpoints. See Jonathan W.
Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401
(1989). Other scholars have offered general discussions of how media concentration supposedly
threatens the democratic values that they see underlying the constitutional commitment to free speech.
See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839 (2002)
[hereinafter Baker, Media Concentration]; Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the
Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J.
561 (2000); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media
Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813; Lawrence Lessig, The
Censorships of Television (Mar. 8, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/tv.pdf). For my criticism of efforts to reconceptualize free
speech in civic republican terms, see Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the TechnologySpecific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 306–46 (2003). More importantly for our
purposes, these analyses have not engaged in any extended analysis of the precise relationship between
media concentration and media content. Other scholars have analyzed the First Amendment
implications of a single type of structural regulation without offering a more general analysis of the
relationship between structural regulation and content. See C. Edwin Baker, Merging Phone and Cable,
17 HASTINGS COMM & ENT. L.J. 97 (1994) (discussing the constitutionality of a provision barring
crossownership of local telephone and cable operations); Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity:
Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the free speech
implications of federal spectrum policy). The most complete discussion of the issue is C. EDWIN
BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 20–62 (2002) (discussing the impact of advertising
support and local concentration on content). Even Baker’s analysis stops short of exploring the full
range of complexities of how structure and content interact.
12. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) [hereinafter “Turner I”].
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affect the diversity of media content. Put another way, structural regulation
can represent a form of “architectural censorship”13 that can have a
tangential, but substantial, adverse impact on speech.14 In so doing, my
analysis reveals that previous First Amendment discussions of structural
regulation have simultaneously been too broad and too narrow. They have
been too broad in their tendency to simply posit that media concentration
necessarily represents a threat to free speech without engaging in any
searching analysis of the precise nature of the relationship between
concentration and content. This analysis suggests that the relationship
between media concentration and the quantity, quality, and diversity of
media content is more complex than is generally realized. At the same
time, prior analyses have been too narrow in restricting their focus to media
concentration. My analysis identifies other structural features that pose
even more serious dangers of architectural censorship than do the concerns
about industry concentration patterns that have dominated the existing
scholarship.
Part II examines how the identified instances of architectural
censorship would fare when measured against current First Amendment
doctrine. Given the potentially adverse impact that structural regulation can
have on the content of speech, one would hope that the First Amendment
would provide a basis for identifying and redressing architectural
13. Professor Baker correctly notes that the term “censorship” is most applicable to situations in
which the government deliberately attempts to affect the content of speech. See C. Edwin Baker, Media
Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 754–755 & n.71
(2005). I concede that I use the term in part to add a touch of rhetorical flourish to my argument. That
said, the censorship label may be more apt than initially appears. Many early attempts to regulate media
structure were intended to influence media content. See, e.g., Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and
3.636 of the Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television
Broadcasting Stations, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, 291–93 (1953) (noting that national ownership
rules were designed in part to “maximize diversification of program and service viewpoints”)
[hereinafter 1953 Multiple Ownership Order]; FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, REPORT ON CHAIN
BROADCASTING 65 (1941) (imposing the Chain Broadcasting Rules in part because network control
hampers local stations’ ability to “broadcast[] such outstanding local events as community concerts,
civic meetings, local sports events, and other programs of local consumer and social interest”). See also
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 676–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
seemingly structural measures designed to protect free broadcasting were really motivated by a desire to
promote more local, educational, and public affairs-related content); Christopher H. Sterling, Television
and Radio Broadcasting, in WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?: COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE
MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY 299, 310 (Benjamin M. Compaine ed., 2d ed. 1982) (noting that “the FCC has
followed an unwritten but fairly clear policy of seeking to modify the ownership of broadcasting
facilities as a means of effecting changes in content”).
14. In some respects, my analysis bears some similarity to Lawrence Lessig’s claim that Internet
protocols represent architectural elements that can censor in much the same manner as the government.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999); Lessig, supra note 11. The
analytical tools that I employ and the claims that I advance are quite different from Professor Lessig’s.
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censorship when it arises. Unfortunately, such hopes are misplaced. Recent
judicial decisions indicate that the most stringent standard of review that
might be applied to structural regulation is the intermediate scrutiny
announced in United States v. O’Brien.15 O’Brien doctrine has been widely
criticized as being too deferential.16 As a result, current Supreme Court
precedent effectively insulates instances of architectural censorship from
meaningful constitutional scrutiny.
Part III briefly explores possible solutions to the de facto
constitutional immunity enjoyed by architectural censorship. Although
courts could leave resolution of these constitutional issues to the political
branches, doing so would represent an abdication of the proper role of
courts and would charge Congress and the executive with responsibilities
that they are loath to bear. The only other alternative is to revise O’Brien
doctrine to take the individual’s interest in speech and the availability of
alternative means of communication seriously. The failure of the Supreme
Court’s recent efforts to put teeth in O’Brien scrutiny, however, makes it
unlikely that architectural censorship will be subject to meaningful First
Amendment review in the foreseeable future.
I.

ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP OF MEDIA CONTENT

This Part employs economic analysis17 to examine four ways in which
the current regime of structural regulation can give rise to architectural
15. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
16. See infra Part II.D.
17. Professor Baker spends a significant portion of his commentary criticizing my work for
taking an economic or “commodity-based” approach to media policy rather than framing the issues in
terms of democracy. See Baker, supra note 13, at 742–747. I have offered two basic criticisms of
attempts to base media regulation on democratic principles elsewhere and will only sketch my
conclusions here. First, by valuing speech for its contributions to democracy, these theories adopt a
consequentialist approach that is at odds with the autonomy-centered vision that has long dominated
free speech theory. Second, the existing democracy-centered theories are too insufficiently theorized to
yield a workable system of media regulation. These theories recognize that their Jeffersonian vision of
small speakers might have to yield to other considerations (including economics), yet fail to provide a
coherent framework for determining how to balance these countervailing considerations. In this respect,
it is telling that such luminaries as Lillian Bevier, Vincent Blasi, Robert Bork, Cass Sunstein, Owen
Fiss, and Harry Kalven have each advanced theories of media regulation that began from similar,
democracy-based premises, and yet have implemented their theories by drawing radically different
conclusions. Yoo, supra note 11, at 306–46. See also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A
Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1953–62 (2000). In this respect, the debate between
economic and democratic visions of media policy parallels a similar debate in antitrust. In that case, the
populist approach to antitrust failed in no small part because of its inability to offer a basis for resolving
the trade-offs between competing considerations. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality
pt. II.E.2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Professor Baker appears to recognize the
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censorship. Although most of the features of the current regime were not
always created out of a desire to affect media content, they nonetheless
have precisely that effect.
A. THE PREFERENCE FOR FREE RADIO AND TELEVISION
The desire to promote free (advertising-supported18) radio and
television over pay versions of the same media has long represented one of
the central tenets of U.S. media policy.19 Policymakers have exhibited
hostility toward radio services that were provided on a fee basis since the
earliest days of radio regulation. This hostility is reflected in the FCC’s
longstanding hostility toward subscription-based radio technologies,20
discernible most recently in its resistance to satellite radio—known
technically as Digital Audio Radio Services (“DARS”)—such as XM and
Sirius.21
problem, and indeed his work on “complex democracy” is among the most promising in the field. See
Baker, supra note 11, at 143–47. Even his laudable efforts fall short of articulating a basis sufficient to
make difficult trade-offs inherent in any system of media regulation.
18. As I have noted elsewhere, the term “free” is something of a misnomer. “Free” radio and
television is only possible because the broadcast industry receives hundreds of billions of dollars worth
of spectrum for free. Indeed, the industry members are the only significant commercial users of
spectrum that do not have to pay for their frequencies. The commitment of these resources inevitably
increases the cost of all other spectrum-based technologies. As a result, the public bears the costs of
“free” radio and television by paying higher fees for cellular telephony and other spectrum-based
technologies. See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1579, 1712–14 (2003).
19. The discussion that follows draws on the more complete analysis appearing in Yoo, supra
note 18, at 1668–82. For other related analyses that draw somewhat different policy conclusions, see
BAKER, supra note 11, at 24–40; Jora R. Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods,
7 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1964); Michael Spence & Bruce Owen, Television Programming, Monopolistic
Competition, and Welfare, 91 Q.J. ECON. 103, 118–19 (1977).
20. See KMLA Broad. Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 41
(C.D. Cal. 1967). See generally Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional
“Broadcast” and Wireless “Carriage”, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1052–57 (1997) (detailing the
hostility toward subscription radio services historically exhibited by the FCC and its predecessor
agency, the Federal Radio Commission). One of the few early exceptions was the transmission of
background music pioneered by the Muzak Corp., which the FCC allowed to be provided on a
subscription basis. See Muzak Corp., 8 F.C.C. 581, 582 (1941). Even then, such subscription services
are generally heavily restricted. See KMLA Broad. Corp., 264 F. Supp. at 37–38 (describing how the
FCC required radio stations to provide background music services solely via subcarrier frequencies and
mandated that those services not interfere with the main-channel transmissions that are available for
free to the entire listening public).
21. See Thomas W. Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation Politics Are Local: A Response to
Christopher Yoo’s Model of Broadcast Regulation, 53 EMORY L.J. 233, 248–52 (2004) (detailing the
manner in which FCC regulations have hampered DARS).
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The hostility toward subscription media services is also manifest in
U.S. television policy.22 When the development of scrambling technology
made subscription television feasible, the FCC acted fairly quickly to stifle
the industry’s growth.23 The bias against pay television services was even
more evident in the FCC’s policies toward cable television, most
particularly in the relentless campaign to require local cable operators to
provide free carriage to all full-power broadcast stations operating in their
service area (commonly known as “must-carry”).24 The desire to foster free
22. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1669–75.
23. The FCC declined to authorize subscription television as a general service and instead, the
FCC merely authorized it on an experimental basis. Amendment of Part 3 of the Commission’s Rules
and Regulations (Radio Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service, Third
Report, 26 F.C.C. 265 (1959). When the FCC eventually authorized more widespread deployment in
1968, it saddled the technology with a host of restrictions. Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission’s
Rules and Regulations (Radio Broadcast Services) to Provide for Subscription Television Service,
Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners v.
FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969). It was only after the D.C. Circuit’s adverse decision in Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28–51 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), that the FCC relented and lifted
the restrictions on subscription television. See Repeal of Programming Restrictions on Subscription
Television, Report and Order, 43 Fed. Reg. 15,322 (F.C.C. Apr. 7, 1978); Amendment of Part 73 of the
Commission’s Rules and Regulations in Regard to Section 73.642(a)(3) and Other Aspects of the
Subscription Television Service, Third Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982).
24. The FCC foreshadowed the imposition of must-carry in the very first decision in which it
asserted jurisdiction over cable systems. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 ¶ 17
(1962), aff’d, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The FCC later imposed must-carry on cable systems
receiving programming through microwave transmission, see Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to
Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for
Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, First Report and
Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 705 ¶ 57, 716–17 ¶¶ 85–90 (1965) [hereinafter CATV First Report and Order],
and extended must-carry to systems that retransmitted over-the-air television broadcasts, Amendment of
Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the
Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna
Systems, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 746 ¶¶ 48–49, 752–53 ¶ 66 (1966) [hereinafter
CATV Second Report and Order] (extending the same rules to all cable systems). See also Amendment
of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna
Television Systems, Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 170–71 ¶ 74, 173–76 ¶¶ 78–
87 (1972) (reaffirming must-carry); Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637 (F.C.C. May 2, 1985) (final rule) (same).
The FCC justified must-carry in large part by a desire to prevent those who are unable or
unwilling to pay for television service from being deprived of it. See Cable Television Syndicated
Program Exclusivity Rules, Report and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 744 ¶ 185 (1980), aff’d sub nom.
Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981); CATV Second Report and Order, supra, at
788–89 ¶ 155; CATV First Report and Order, supra, at 699 ¶ 44, 700 ¶ 48(1).
Eventually, congressional intervention was necessary before must-carry could withstand judicial
review. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§§ 4–5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471–81 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (2000)). The mustcarry statute would eventually be sustained by the Supreme Court as a valid means to further the
government’s interest in “preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television.” Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) [hereinafter “Turner II”].
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television is apparent in the steps taken to regulate direct broadcast satellite
(“DBS”) systems, such as DirecTV and the Dish Network,25 and underlies
the FCC’s decision to deploy digital television through broadcasters rather
than through cable and satellite providers.26
Historically, efforts by Congress and the FCC to promote free radio
and television have not been driven by content-based motivations. Instead,
they are the result of a desire to preserve access for households that cannot
afford subscription services.27 Although these goals are quite laudable,
application of economic analysis reveals that fostering advertisingsupported radio and television has had a hidden, deleterious effect on the
quantity, quality, and diversity of programming provided.
25. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 101 (1999) (noting that the Satellite Home Viewer
Improvement Act was “intended to preserve free television for those not served by satellite or cable
systems”); S. REP. NO. 106–51, at 1 (1999) (recognizing that the purpose of the legislation was
“protecting the availability of free, local over-the-air television”); id. at 13 (finding that “maintaining
free over-the-air-television is a preeminent public interest” and identifying “protecting the viability of
free, local, over-the-air television” as one of the statute’s purposes); H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 26
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5655 (expressing the concern that, if unregulated,
satellite television would “undermine the base of free local television service upon which the American
people continue to rely”).
26. The FCC has repeatedly justified the importance of deploying digital television through
broadcasting rather than other television services on the grounds that broadcasting, unlike subscription
services, represents a “free” service that is available to almost all U.S. households. See Advanced
Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,811–12 ¶ 5, 12,820 ¶¶ 27–29 (1997); Advanced Television Systems and
Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 11 F.C.C.R. 6235, 6249 ¶ 36 (1996); Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon
Existing Television Broadcast Service, Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, 3342 ¶ 4 (1992); Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the
Existing Television Broadcast Service, Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R.
6520, 6525 ¶¶ 38–39 (1988). See also Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the
Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fourth Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,787–88 ¶ 33
(1996) (noting that the goals of digital television deployment include preserving a free, universal
broadcasting service); Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,541 ¶ 6, 10,543 ¶ 22 (1995) (same). Concerns
about preserving free television have also animated the FCC’s proceedings regarding the extension of
the must-carry rules to digital programming. See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, First
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2600 ¶ 3, 2648 ¶ 113
(2001); Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broadcast Stations, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 15,092, 15,114–15 ¶ 43 (1998).
27. See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(a)(12), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (finding a “substantial government interest in promoting the
continued availability of such free television programming, especially for viewers who are unable to
afford other means of receiving programming”); Turner II, 520 U.S. at 190 (relying on the need to
preserve free television to uphold must-carry).
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1. Impact on the Quantity of Television Produced
Reliance on advertising support is likely to lead to a systematic
underfinancing of media programming. When broadcasters derive revenue
solely from advertising, one would expect the total revenue to be
determined by viewers’ and listeners’ responsiveness to the advertising
contained within programs. In other words, advertisers will increase their
spending so long as the revenue generated by exposing audiences to an
additional commercial exceeds the cost of purchasing an additional
commercial.
Although it is possible that audiences’ responsiveness to advertising
might yield the same net revenue as direct payments for the underlying
programs, there is no theoretical reason to expect that these levels would be
the same.28 In fact, the available empirical evidence indicates that
advertisers place a significantly lower value on programming than viewers
and listeners. One oft-cited study conducted in the 1970s estimated that
viewers were willing to pay seven times more for television programming
than were advertisers.29 A pair of recent event studies confirmed those
results by showing that television programs financed by pay-per-view
generate significantly greater revenue than programs financed by
advertising support.30
28.
29.

See Minasian, supra note 19, at 74–75. See also Spence & Owen, supra note 19, at 104–05.
See ROGER G. NOLL, MERTON J. PECK & JOHN J. MCGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
TELEVISION REGULATION 23 (1973). See also Harvey J. Levin, Program Duplication, Diversity, and
Effective Viewer Choices: Some Empirical Findings, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 81, 82, 88 (1971) (concluding
that entry by pay television supported more informational programming and other special interest
programming than would advertising-supported television); Spence & Owen, supra note 19, at 118–19
(drawing on the Noll-Peck-McGowan data to show that reliance on advertising support was suppressing
the emergence of a fourth television network). Although other economists have quibbled with the
precise size of this disparity, they do not dispute the fundamental conclusion that consumers are willing
to pay far more for television than advertisers. See Stanley M. Besen & Bridger M. Mitchell, Noll, Peck,
and McGowan’s Economic Aspects of Television Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 301,
308–11 (1974) (book review); Bryan Ellickson, Hedonic Theory and the Demand for Cable Television,
69 AM. ECON. REV. 183, 188–89 (1979).
30. See Claus Thustrup Hansen & Søren Kyhl, Pay-Per-View Broadcasting of Outstanding
Events: Consequences of a Ban, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 589, 590, 601, 604 (2001); Steinar Holden,
Network or Pay-Per-View?: A Welfare Analysis, 43 ECON. LETTERS 59, 62–64 (1993). It is interesting
to note that these two studies drew different normative implications from the same empirical findings.
The difference results from the fact that the Hansen and Kyhl study employed the generally accepted
welfare metric of total surplus, while the Holden study focused solely on consumer surplus. This
disagreement over the proper welfare metric should not obscure the conclusion drawn by both studies
that a shift to pay television would cause the total revenue captured by the programmer to increase and
would make possible programming that would not exist if advertising support were the sole source of
revenue.
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These studies indicate that advertising support drastically understates
the intensity of consumers’ preferences for television and radio
programming and that reliance on advertising support causes revenue to
drop far below efficient levels. Put another way, favoring advertising
support over direct payments systematically starves programming of
resources. Programmers would be able to generate substantially greater
revenues (and thus devote greater resources to production) if they were
allowed to charge directly for programs.31 Preventing them from doing so
has the effect of reducing the total amount of television and radio
programming produced.
The policy commitment to foster advertising-supported television has
also had the indirect effect of hindering the development of multichannel
television technologies.32 This preference was implicit in the regulations
requiring cable and satellite television providers to carry all full-power
local broadcast stations.33 The bias against multichannel technologies was
made explicit during proceedings to determine how to deploy digital
television.34 The unfortunate result of this bias against new, multichannel
technologies is a restriction on the amount of channel capacity available in
any local market.35 As we shall see, limitations on channel capacity play a
31. I do not mean to suggest that advertising support should be banned, but rather that television
and radio providers should be allowed to rely on subscription fees or advertising as they see fit. I would
not expect the market to rely exclusively on either form of financing. On the contrary, the most likely
result would be a mix of networks, some relying solely on advertising, some relying solely on direct
viewer payments, and some relying on a combination of the two, resembling the current market for
newspapers in many cities. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1682.
32. See id. at 1703.
33. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
34. The initial regulations encouraged digital broadcasters to transmit a single stream of high
definition television rather than multiple streams of standard definition television. Advanced Television
Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broadcast Service, First Report and Order, 5
F.C.C.R. 5627, 5627 ¶ 1, 5629 ¶ 12 (1990).
35. This effect is the most dramatic with respect to the local carriage obligation imposed on
satellite television services, such as DBS. By its nature, DBS provides service on a national scale. As a
result, DBS providers who wish to offer programming from the major broadcast networks (namely,
ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox) in Nashville must necessarily transmit that programming to the entire
country even though no one outside of Nashville would be legally allowed to receive those signals.
Although the DBS providers are in the process of deploying “spot beam” technology that should allow
them to restrict the geographic coverage of particular channels, such technologies are not likely to be
operational for several years. Requiring DBS providers to carry all local stations in any market in which
they would like to provide local service forces them to dedicate large amounts of their limited channel
capacity to transmitting redundant signals that only a small portion of the country can legally receive.
This has the inevitable effect of reducing the number of channels that viewers in any particular city can
receive.
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critical role in causing media markets to underproduce programming that
appeals to relatively small audience segments.36
2. Impact on the Quality and the Diversity of Programming
Reliance on advertising also reduces program quality and diversity.
Limiting programs’ ability to generate revenue necessarily increases the
minimum audience size needed for a program to break even. This in turn
has the inevitable effect of skewing the market against programming that
appeals only to a relatively small segment of the audience.37
Conventional markets provide a straightforward mechanism for
encouraging the production of low-volume products that enrich the product
mix, as evidenced by the survival of high-priced boutiques in a world
increasingly dominated by mass-market discounters. So long as consumers
who prefer those low-volume products are willing and able to pay more for
them, the total revenue generated will be sufficient to cover costs, even if
those costs are substantially higher. Stated more formally, low-volume
products can exist so long as consumers can use prices to signal the
intensity of their preferences.
Advertising support effectively forecloses viewers and listeners from
using prices to signal the intensity of their preferences. Simply put,
advertising support provides viewers and listeners with only a single degree
of freedom with which to signal the intensity of their preferences. They can
either choose to view the programming offered by the network, in which
case the network derives revenue equivalent to that type of viewer’s
responsiveness to advertising, or they can choose not to watch, in which
case the network receives nothing. This limits viewers to an all-or-nothing
signal of their preferences.38 It makes revenue largely a function of
audience size,39 thereby preventing small audiences from obtaining the
programming they want no matter how much they are willing to pay for it.
The recent financial and critical success of HBO provides an eloquent
demonstration of these dynamics. Viewers’ ability to signal intensity of
36. See infra notes 102, 109, 125–127 and accompanying text.
37. See Spence & Owen, supra note 19, at 112.
38. This distortion is analogous to the problem endemic in many election schemes, in which
voters simply vote “yes” or “no” for a particular candidate without being able to signal the intensity of
their preferences. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (2000); Saul
Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111 (2000).
39. See, e.g., Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 208–09 (1997) (collecting empirical research confirming
the “direct correlation [between] size in audience and station [advertising] revenues” (alterations in
original and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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preference through direct payments allows HBO to generate more than half
the revenue of CBS even though its prime time audience is almost fifteen
times smaller.40 In other words, HBO is able to generate roughly eight
times more revenue per viewer than CBS. This makes it far easier for HBO
to produce programs that appeal to relatively small audiences. In addition,
to the extent that program quality is correlated with the amount spent
producing each program, a shift to subscription services also causes
program quality to improve. Indeed, HBO’s dominance of recent Emmy
Awards provides a powerful demonstration of this effect.41
Reliance on advertising support has the inevitable effect of excluding
programming that appeals only to small audiences, regardless of both the
strength of viewers’ and listeners’ preferences and their willingness to pay.
Reliance on advertising support thus tends to reduce the diversity of the
programming mix by preventing the survival of economically viable
programs that appeal only to small audiences.42 Indeed, recent empirical
studies focusing on black and Hispanic audiences, who represent precisely
the type of small audiences with nonmainstream preferences that
advertising support tends to disfavor, indicate they are in fact underserved
in precisely the manner that this theory predicts.43
Conversely, allowing direct payments for preferred programming
would make it far easier for programming strongly desired by a small
portion of the audience to appear. To use a somewhat fanciful example,
suppose that there is a small group of ten thousand opera lovers who each
would be willing to pay up to $1000 to view the entire season of the New
York Metropolitan Opera on television.44 If these opera lovers were able to
make direct payments to the television network, they would be able to offer
40. See John M. Higgins, Still Strutting after All These Years: Although NBC Remains No. 1,
CBS Is Close Behind, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 13, 2004, at 20, 21, 24 (reporting that CBS had
2004 revenue of $4.45 billion with an average audience of 13.3 million, while HBO had 2004 revenue
of $2.4 billion with an average audience of 893,000).
41. See Mike Duffy, Sunday Belongs to HBO: Cable Network Is the Emmy Powerhouse to Beat,
DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 21, 2003, at 1E; Bernard Weinraub, HBO Is Big Winner at Emmy Awards, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2004, at A22;
42. See Spence & Owen, supra note 19, at 113; SIMON P. ANDERSON & STEPHEN COATE,
MARKET PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THE CASE OF BROADCASTING 23–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7513, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7513.
43. Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Race and Radio: Preference Externalities, Minority
Ownership, and the Provision of Programming to Minorities, 10 ADVERTISING & DIFFERENTIATED
PRODUCTS 73, 80–83 (Michael R. Baye & Jon P. Nelson eds., 2001); Joel Waldfogel, Preference
Externalities: An Empirical Study of Who Benefits Whom in Differentiated-Product Markets, 34 RAND
J. ECON. 557 (2003).
44. For those with different tastes, the example applies equally well to a small group of loyal
fans of a team located in a different city.
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a total of $10 million to a station willing to provide such programming, in
which case the programming might well appear. If the network offering
this programming were forced to rely solely on advertising support, the
amount of revenue that such a program would capture would be limited by
the amount of advertised products that this relatively small group of opera
lovers would be willing to buy. In this case, the revenue generated by
advertising support would likely be only a fraction of that generated by
direct payments.45
3. Distortions Resulting from Allowing Advertisers to Serve as
Intermediaries
Reliance on advertising support introduces additional market
distortions by allowing advertisers to serves as intermediaries in the
relationship between audiences and program producers. Although reliance
on advertising support tends to make the impact of any particular audience
member more uniform than would be possible under a system of direct
payments, the fact that individuals with certain demographic characteristics
are likely to be more responsive to advertising inevitably makes some
audience members more valuable to advertisers than others.46
This, in turn, can skew the markets away from an audience’s true
preferences. For example, reliance on advertising support encourages
television and radio programmers to be consumerist in focus and tends to
make them excessively sensitive to the preferences of those demographic
groups that are the most responsive to advertising.47 Consequently, it tends
45. Professor Baker chides me for ignoring externalities. See Baker, supra note 13, at 749. This
criticism is in tension with one of the central economic lessons of the past half-century, which is that, so
long as transaction costs are low, markets are far more effective at dealing with externalities than
previously thought. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For my
analysis of the implications of externalities and transaction costs on media ownership policy, see
Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON
REG. 171, 193–200, 213–17, 232–37 (2002). To the extent that the relevant externalities are positive
externalities enjoyed by audiences, however, the collective action problems created by the large number
of people involved may cause markets to fail. See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Coasean Critique
of Broadcast Regulation (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Even if transaction costs
prevent markets from fully internalizing the extant externalities, the classic solution would be subsidies
(or perhaps liability rules) rather than ownership restrictions. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE 192–94 (4th ed. 1932) (subsidies); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (liability
rules).
46. See Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan & David S. Evans, The Audience-Revenue
Relationship for Local Television Stations, 11 BELL J. ECON. 694 (1980).
47. See BAKER, supra note 11, at 26; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH 71 (1993).
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to bias the market against programming preferred by those who are the
least responsive to advertising. For example, one would expect that reliance
on advertising support would tend to lead to a systematic underproduction
of children’s educational television, since purchasing decisions are
typically made by supervising parents whose responsiveness to the
commercials contained in children’s programming is constrained by the
fact that they frequently do not see the commercials at all.48 Allowing
parents to make direct payments for programming would provide a much
more straightforward means for signaling their preferences. It is almost
certainly no accident that most of the best children’s educational
programming on commercial television appears on cable.49
Reliance on advertising support also allows the biases of particular
advertisers to influence the program mix. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
some advertisers have discouraged networks from offering programming
that addresses controversial issues or that casts their products in a poor
light.50 This reliance also leaves programmers vulnerable to the political
biases of advertisers and special interest groups. Consider, for example, the
recent controversy surrounding the miniseries The Reagans, originally
scheduled to air on CBS. When dissatisfaction with the portrayal of the
former President and First Lady threatened to erupt into a consumer
boycott of any products advertised during the miniseries, Viacom shifted
the program from CBS to Showtime, a premium movie channel that does
not depend on advertising support.51
This episode bears a striking resemblance to the reaction to a pair of
programs on abortion aired during the 1970s. When NBC tried to broadcast
its movie version of Roe v. Wade, it faced such a backlash from advertisers
that it eventually opted to show the movie without commercials, which in
turn caused it to incur significant economic losses on the project.52 This is
in sharp contrast to the relative ease with which HBO was able to air a
documentary on the same subject. The fundamental difference is that
HBO’s survival does not depend on its ability to assuage sponsors. As one
48. See Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report and Order,
11 F.C.C.R. 10,660, 10,675 ¶¶ 32–33 (1996).
49. See Yoo, supra note 11, at 327–28.
50. See BAKER, supra note 11, at 24–30; SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 63–65; Steven Shiffrin,
The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 696–713 (1994).
51. See Meg James, Greg Braxton & Bob Baker, The Vetoing of “Reagans”: How Protests and
Bad Timing Led CBS to Cancel a Movie About the Former First Couple, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at
E1; Emily Nelson & Joe Flint, CBS Pulls “Reagans” amid Opposition from Conservatives, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 5, 2003, at A3.
52. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 65; Shiffrin, supra note 50, at 698.
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HBO executive explained, “We’re not any braver than the networks. It’s
just that our economic basis is different.”53
It is thus clear that the FCC’s historical commitment to promoting a
radio and television industry supported by advertising represents a form of
architectural censorship that has had the unintended consequence of
reducing the overall quantity, quality, and diversity of radio and television
programming. Although a number of other scholars recognizing the
problems associated with advertising support have proposed second-order
corrective measures,54 I would prefer the more straightforward solution of
eliminating the hostility toward fee-based services. Advertising-supported
media would appear to be a singularly inefficient mechanism for ensuring
that all U.S. households have access to media regardless of their
socioeconomic status. The evidence suggests that a targeted subsidy
system, in which households falling below the poverty line are given
discounted service, would be far more effective than the current system of
untargeted subsidies.55
Recent pronouncements by Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
FCC, however, make it quite likely that the commitment to preserving free
television will remain one of the central aims of U.S. media policy for the
foreseeable future.56 As long as that is the case, this policy will continue to
have unintended and adverse impacts on the content of speech.
B. RATE REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION
Another common feature of U.S. media policy has been the imposition
of rate regulation on the cable television industry.57 These efforts were
clearly designed to protect consumers against excessive prices charged by
53. Jan Hoffman, TV Shouts “Baby” (and Barely Whispers “Abortion”), N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
1992, at H1, quoted in Shiffrin, supra note 50, at 698.
54. See BAKER, supra note 11, at 98–99, 114–21; SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 84–88.
55. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1675–76; Yoo, supra note 11, at 354–55.
56. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102385, § 2(a)(12), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534–535 (2000)); Turner I,
512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (recognizing that “nearly 40% of American households still rely on broadcast
stations as their exclusive source of television programming” and holding that “protecting noncable
households from loss of regular television broadcasting service” is an important federal interest
(internal quotation marks omitted)); 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,674–75 ¶ 148
(identifying “the preservation of free, universally available local broadcast television in a digital world”
as an important goal).
57. For a useful overview of the early history of cable rate regulation, see Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 178–80 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (opinion of Randolph, J.).
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local cable monopolists.58 Because of its economic focus and its
unrelatedness to program content, rate regulation represents a classic
example of structural regulation. As a result, conventional wisdom
presumes that rate regulation has little to no impact on the content of
speech.59
The on-again/off-again history of cable rate regulation60 provides an
ideal opportunity for using event studies to assess its effectiveness
empirically. Somewhat surprisingly, these studies indicate that rate
regulation has largely been a failure. Despite the fact that rate regulation
was designed to protect consumers against excessive prices charged by
cable operators who did not face effective competition, the evidence
suggests that rate regulation failed to yield any real welfare benefits for
consumers.61
The key to understanding why rate regulation proved to be such a
disappointment is to acknowledge the regime’s inherent limitations. Rate
regulation has always worked best when applied to commodity services, in
which the quality and type of service provided does not vary. The would-be
monopolist has only one dimension—price—with which it can extract
surplus from consumers. When that is the case, limiting the prices that
monopolists charge may well prove effective in limiting the exercise of
market power.
A different situation obtains when the regulated service is not a
commodity.62 Where products vary in terms of quality, price represents
58. See 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1) (2000); Time Warner, 56 F.3d at 184–85.
59. See Time Warner, 56 F.3d at 183.
60. Rate regulation was widely imposed by cities until 1984, at which point it was effectively
abolished by Congress. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, sec.
623(b), 98 Stat. 2779, 2788 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (allowing rate
regulation unless cable operators faced “effective competition”); Implementation of the Provisions of
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,648–50 ¶¶ 91–100 (F.C.C.
May 2, 1985) (final rule) (defining “effective competition” in a way that exempted 96% of all cable
systems). Congress reinstated cities’ authority to regulate cable rates in 1992. See Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 1460, 1464.
It abruptly changed course once again four years later by passing another statute largely deregulating
cable rates. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 301(b), 110 Stat. 56, 114–15.
61. See generally THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD
CABLE TELEVISION (1997); Gregory S. Crawford, The Impact of the 1992 Cable Act on Household
Demand and Welfare, 31 RAND J. ECON. 422 (2000).
62. See generally David Besanko, Shabtai Donnenfeld & Lawrence J. White, Monopoly and
Quality Distortion: Effects and Remedies, 102 Q.J. ECON. 743 (1987); David Besanko, Shabtai
Donnenfeld & Lawrence J. White, The Multiproduct Firm, Quality Choice, and Regulation, 36 J.
INDUS. ECON. 411 (1988); Kenneth S. Corts, Regulation of a Multi-Product Monopolist: Effects on
Pricing and Bundling, 43 J. INDUS. ECON. 377 (1995).
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only one of several dimensions along which producers can appeal to
customers. Unless the regulator imposes comprehensive controls over
quality as well as price, the regulated entity may evade any price
restrictions simply by degrading the quality of its product offerings.
Indeed, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that this is precisely
what has occurred in the cable industry. Although rate regulation caused
nominal cable prices to drop, once other characteristics—such as the total
number and quality of channels offered—are taken into account, the
empirical evidence indicates that rate regulation caused quality-adjusted
rates to increase and that deregulation caused quality-adjusted rates to
fall.63 This implies that consumers would have preferred larger, higher
quality bundles of channels than they received under rate regulation, even
if acquiring them meant paying higher prices. Placing a cap on cable rates
simply limited cable operators’ ability to move their product packages
closer to consumers’ ideal preferences.64
It thus appears that rate regulation did little to prevent local cable
operators from exercising whatever monopoly power they possessed.
Instead, rate regulation had the unintended consequence of degrading the
quality of existing cable offerings and foreclosing the emergence of higher
quality channel packages despite viewers’ willingness to pay for them.65
63.

See HAZLETT & SPITZER, supra note 61, at 2, 69–177, 208; Crawford, supra note 61, at 444–

45.
64. Cable operators wishing to add high-end programming did have another option. They could
have purchased it on an à la carte/premium channel basis. Forcing cable operators, however, to offer
such channels on a stand-alone basis can have a dramatic impact. It prevents the operator from
obtaining the benefits of bundling, which in turn makes it possible for the cable operator to offer a
wider range of programming. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1706–12.
65. Baker argues that distributive concerns, particularly the need to preserve access to the media
by the poor, might justify cable rate regulation. See Baker, supra note 13, at 748. As is typical of
economic analyses, my argument is not focused on distribution. That said, Baker’s position is somewhat
inconsistent with the basic structure of media policy. As noted earlier, preserving access to television by
all citizens represents one of the central commitments of U.S. policy with respect to broadcasting. See
supra notes 17–22, 25 and accompanying text. Broadcast stations remain the only commercial users
who are not required to pay for their spectrum. The justification for what some Senators have
condemned as an unsupportable act of corporate welfare is the need to preserve access to television.
Yoo, supra note 18, at 1673–74, 1700. Conservative estimates place the value of this spectrum
giveaway at $450 billion. See Hazlett, supra note 21, at 252 & n.44. The need to preserve access to
broadcast television also represented one of the central justifications for must-carry. See supra notes 23,
26 and accompanying text. Having already set aside broadcasting as the medium for ensuring universal
access to television and after having committed so many resources to ensure that it is available to
everyone, regulating cable to accomplish the same end would seem excessive. Even if that were the
goal, it is quite likely that direct subsidies would represent a far more effective means for promoting
indigent access to cable television. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1675–76; Yoo, supra note 11, at 354–55.
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C. RESTRICTIONS ON HORIZONTAL CONCENTRATION
The FCC has long restricted the number of media outlets that one
entity can own in any local media market. Some rules focus on intramedia
crossownership. They originated as a preference in licensing hearings
against holding licenses to two AM radio stations operating in the same
city.66 The FCC formalized this licensing preference in a “duopoly rule”
promulgated in 1940, which explicitly prohibited anyone from holding
licenses for two television stations or two FM radio stations that served
substantially the same area.67 The duopoly rule was extended to AM radio
in 1943.68
Other restrictions focus on intermedia crossownership. Like the
intramedia crossownership restrictions, intermedia crossownership
restrictions began in licensing hearings as a preference in favor of
diversification of media ownership.69 In the 1970s, the FCC formalized
these preferences into a series of explicit intermedia crossownership
restrictions. The principal intermedia crossownership restrictions included
(1) the “one-to-a-market” rule, which prohibited combined ownership of a
radio and television station in the same local market;70 (2) the
66. See Genesee Radio Corp., 5 F.C.C. 183, 186–87 (1938).
67. See 6 FCC ANN. REP. 68 (1940).
68. See Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,065 (F.C.C. Nov. 27,
1943). The FCC tightened the duopoly rule in 1969, abolishing the more permissive standard that only
prohibited joint ownership if the stations served “substantially the same area” in favor of a more
stringent restriction forbidding joint ownership of radio stations that had any overlap in their primary
service contours, no matter how small. The rule was even more restrictive for television, which
prohibited joint ownership of stations whenever there was any overlap in their secondary service
contours. See Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 45 F.C.C. 1728 (1964).
69. See, e.g., Port Huron Broad. Co., 5 F.C.C. 177, 182 (1938); Newspaper Ownership of Radio
Stations, 9 Fed. Reg. 702 (F.C.C. Jan. 18, 1944) (notice of dismissal of proceeding). See generally
Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394–95 (1965) (identifying
“[d]iversification of control of the media of mass communications” as a “factor of primary
significance” in comparative licensing proceedings) (italics omitted). The FCC’s early application of
this criterion was far from consistent. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 64–69 (1962); Bernard Schwartz,
Comparative Television and the Chancellor’s Foot, 47 GEO. L.J. 655, 673–78, 685–94 (1959).
70. See Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, First Report and Order, 22
F.C.C.2d 306, 308 ¶ 8 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Multiple Ownership Order]. Shortly thereafter, the FCC
liberalized the one-to-a-market rule to permit AM-FM combinations in the same market and to allow
existing radio licensees to acquire UHF stations in the same market. See Amendment of Sections 73.35,
73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and
Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971).
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newspaper/broadcast crossownership rule, which banned common
ownership of a newspaper and broadcast station when the broadcast
station’s service contour completely encompassed the newspaper’s city of
publication;71 (3) the cable/broadcast crossownership rule, which
effectively prohibited the owner of a local cable system from also owning a
local broadcast station;72 and (4) the cable/local telephone company
crossownership rule, which prohibited local telephone companies from
providing video programming to subscribers in their respective local
service area.74
The FCC has long justified its restrictions on horizontal concentration
with two rationales: the need to protect competition75 and the need to
promote a diversity of programming and viewpoints.76 The first is
completely economic in focus and unrelated to the content of speech. The
second implicates First Amendment concerns more directly because
71. See Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating
to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order,
50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Multiple Ownership Order].
72. As a formal matter, this rule only prohibits a cable television system from carrying the signal
of any broadcast television station if it owns a broadcast station in the same local market. Amendment
of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna
Television Systems, Second Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 816, 820–21 689 ¶ 12–14 (1970)
[hereinafter Community Antenna Order]. When combined with the cable operators’ must-carry
obligations, this rule effectively prohibits cable/broadcast crossownership. See Fox Television Stations,
Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
74. Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities
Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d
307, 323–25 ¶¶ 43–49 (1970), aff’d sub nom. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d
846 (5th Cir. 1971). This requirement was codified by the 1984 Cable Act. See Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, sec. 613(b)(1), 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (originally codified at
47 U.S.C. § 533(b)).
75. See, e.g., Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission’s Rules, the Broadcast Multiple
Ownership Rules, First Report and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1723, 1724 ¶ 8, 1727 ¶¶ 32–33 (1989) [hereinafter
1989 Multiple Ownership Order]; 1975 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 71, at 1074 ¶ 99; 1970
Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 70, at 307 ¶ 3 ; Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television
Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476, 1476–77 ¶¶ 2–3 (1964) [hereinafter 1964
Multiple Ownership Order]; Genesee Radio Corp., 5 F.C.C. 183, 186–87 (1938).
76. See, e.g., Genesee, 5 F.C.C. at 186–87; 1989 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 75, at
1723–24 ¶ 7, 1727 ¶ 31; 1975 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 71, at 1074 ¶ 99; 1970 Multiple
Ownership Order, supra note 70, at 307 ¶ 3; 1964 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 75, at 1476–
77 ¶¶ 2–3.
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“ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit, and to choose the
methods, manner and emphasis of presentation.”77
Several forces led the FCC to relax a number of these rules in the
ensuing years. The first was a series of deregulatory initiatives launched
during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.78
Furthermore, a series of lower federal court decisions handed down during
the mid-1990s voided the cable/local telephone company crossownership
rule on First Amendment grounds.79 The issue had already been briefed and
argued before the Supreme Court when it was rendered moot by a
provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that eliminated the
rule.80
77. 1975 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 71, at 1050 ¶ 14.
78. In 1989, the FCC relaxed the duopoly rule. Under the old rule, common ownership of two
broadcast stations in the same service was prohibited if there was any overlap in the two stations’
primary service contours. Under the new rule, same-service common ownership would be prohibited
only if the two stations’ principal city contours overlapped. 1989 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note
75, at 1723. The next day, the FCC relaxed the one-to-a-market rule to allow for a presumptive waiver
for failed stations and for crossownership in the top twenty-five markets so long as thirty independent
voices remain in the market. Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission’s Rules, the Broadcast
Multiple Ownership Rules, Second Report and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1741 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Second
Multiple Ownership Order]. In 1992, the FCC repealed the network/cable crossownership rule.
Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J, Section 76.501 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations to
Eliminate the Prohibition on Common Ownership of Cable Television Systems and National Television
Networks, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 6156, 6162–63 ¶ 10 (1992) [hereinafter Order to Eliminate the
Prohibition on Common Ownership]. The FCC also relaxed the duopoly rule with respect to radio,
allowing a single entity to own two AM and two FM stations in the same market so long as the market
contained fifteen or more commercial stations and so long as the radio combinations did not exceed a
designated audience share. In smaller markets, the 1992 amendments permitted a single entity to own
three radio stations, no more than two of which could be in the same service. Revision of Radio Rules
and Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2757–61 ¶¶ 4–12 (1992) [hereinafter Radio Rules and
Policies]. The FCC also initiated proceedings to revisit the rules with respect to television. See
Broadcast Services, 60 Fed. Reg. 6,490 (F.C.C. Feb. 2, 1995) (further notice of proposed rulemaking).
Television Broadcast Services; Video Marketplace, 57 Fed. Reg. 28,163 (F.C.C. June 24, 1992) (notice
of proposed rulemaking); Broadcast and Cable Services, Effect of Changes in the Video Marketplace,
56 Fed. Reg. 40,847 (F.C.C. Aug. 16, 1991) (notice of inquiry).
79. See US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 516
U.S. 1155 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); S. New England Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn.
1995); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v.
United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. 93-323-P-C,
1994 WL 779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994). See generally Glen O. Robinson, The New Video Competition:
Dances with Regulators, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1016, 1018–24 (1997) (reviewing these cases).
80. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 124
(repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994)).
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The 1996 Act also contained a number of provisions raising the
thresholds needed to trigger various horizontal ownership restrictions.81 In
addition, Congress directed the FCC to create a biennial review process in
which it would revisit all of its ownership rules every two years to
“determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as
a result of competition” and to “repeal or modify any regulation it
determines to be no longer in the public interest.”82 The FCC amended a
number of its rules during its initial biennial review, but left many others in
place.83 This was followed by a pair of decisions issued by the D.C. Circuit
in 2002 striking down the FCC’s refusal to revisit the cable/broadcast
crossownership84 and the revised duopoly rules.85
Judicial invalidation of these ownership restrictions prompted the FCC
to undertake a massive reassessment of the regulations as part of its 2002
biennial review proceeding. Rejecting calls for repeal of most of its
ownership rules, the FCC instead replaced the hodgepodge of local
ownership rules with a new, integrated approach based on a “diversity
index” designed to take into account all media when assessing the overall
81. Specifically, the Act substantially relaxed the one-to-a-market rule with respect to radio. Id.
§ 202(b), 110 Stat. at 110. It also directed the FCC to conduct a proceeding to determine whether to
retain, modify, or eliminate the duopoly rule with respect to television. Id. § 202(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 111.
It expanded a presumptive waiver to the radio/television crossownership rule for the top twenty-five
markets discussed above, supra note 70, to cover the top fifty markets. § 202(d), 110 Stat. at 111. The
Act also repealed the statutory provision prohibiting cable/telephone company crossownership. Id.
§ 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 124. It also repealed the provision codifying the cable/broadcast
crossownership rule. Id. § 202(i), 110 Stat. at 112. Repealing the statutory ban on cable/broadcast
crossownership left in place the parallel regulatory requirement imposed by the FCC. See Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537
(D.C. Cir. 2002).
82. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111–12.
83. Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 64 Fed. Reg.
50,651 (F.C.C. Sept. 17, 1999) (final rule). Of particular note is the manner in which the FCC relaxed
the one-to-a-market rule and the duopoly rule for television. In each case, the FCC incorporated an
“independent voices” test into the rule that allowed a greater degree of crossownership if a sufficient
number of independent ownership groups remained after the merger. There was one key difference
between the two independent voices tests devised by the FCC. With respect to the duopoly rules, the
FCC took an expansive view of what constituted an independent voice, including other media such as
radio stations, daily newspapers, and local cable systems. Id. at 50,659–60. The Commission took a
much narrower approach when determining what constituted an independent voice for purposes of the
one-to-a-market rule, limiting its scope only to other television stations. Id. at 50,655 ¶ 30.
84. See Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1049–52. On remand, the FCC declined the
opportunity to attempt to generate an alternative justification for the rule and instead simply repealed it.
2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,620. The D.C. Circuit also invalidated the FCC’s
national television station ownership rule. Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1040–47. As that rule is
primarily vertical, rather than horizontal, in focus, it is discussed infra notes 172–173 and
accompanying text.
85. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162–65 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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competitiveness of the local market.86 The FCC supplemented the
traditional concerns of competition and diversity of viewpoints87 with one
additional policy consideration that was often asserted in connection with
television and radio policy, but had not previously been invoked with
respect to horizontal ownership restrictions: localism.88 Interestingly, in
each instance, the FCC concluded that relaxation of the horizontal
ownership restrictions would have no adverse impact on the responsiveness
of media outlets to the needs and interests of their local communities.89
Unlike vertical integration, which can give national networks the power to
dictate local programming decisions, horizontal integration has no effect on
localism, since the locus of programming decisions remains within the
community.90 In many cases, the record suggested that permitting greater
horizontal concentration would actually promote localism by allowing
media outlets to realize the efficiencies associated with crossownership.91
Shortly after the issuance of the biennial review order, the Third
Circuit issued a stay preventing it from going into effect pending judicial
review.92 The court, somewhat remarkably, held that it could ignore the
traditional requirement that the party seeking the stay demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits—generally regarded as one of the
standard requirements for the grant of a stay—if the issues were
sufficiently complex and the hardships sufficiently severe.93 The Third
Circuit subsequently remanded the changes to the horizontal ownership
restrictions that would have been effected by the biennial review order.94
86. 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,775–807 ¶¶ 391–481.
87. Id. at 13,627–43 ¶¶ 18–72.
88. Id. at 13,643–45 ¶¶ 73–79. See also id. at 13,738 ¶ 304 (noting that the FCC had not
previously emphasized localism as a justification for restricting the number of radio stations one entity
could own in any one locality).
89. See id. at 13,737–38 ¶¶ 302–304, 13,753–54 ¶ 342, 13,772–73 ¶ 383.
90. Id. at 13,738 ¶ 304.
91. See id. at 13,678–85 ¶¶ 155–169, 13,753–60 ¶¶ 342–354, 13,772–73 ¶¶ 382–385; infra Part
I.C.2.
92. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003).
93. Id. at *1 (citing Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841,
843 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
94. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming the FCC’s power
to regulate ownership restrictions, but remanding several portions of the order as not sufficiently
supported by the record).

YOOBAKE19.DOC

2005]

3/28/2005 4:30 PM

ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP

693

1. The Complex Relationship Between Market Concentration and
Program Diversity
There is general agreement that horizontal concentration affects
program diversity, although theorists differ as to the precise nature of the
relationship. On the one hand are commentators who are largely critical of
increases in media concentration and warn that the likely result will be a
reduction in the quantity and diversity of media content.95 On the other
hand are scholars who adopt the less intuitive position that increases in
market concentration can promote program quality and diversity.96 This
section outlines a more complex approach that captures the nuances of both
positions. As with most economic issues, the truth lies somewhere in
between.
a. Steiner Models
Reconciliation of these two divergent inferences requires an
understanding of how it is possible for media monopolies to produce
greater program diversity than competitive markets. The argument has its
roots in the model of local radio markets proposed by Peter Steiner,97
which has subsequently been adapted to the television industry98 and which
has gained substantial attention from courts,99 commentators,100 and the
FCC.101
95. See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (6th ed. 2000); EDWARD S. HERMAN
& NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 3–
14 (1988); Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 11; Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 11, at
832–34, 859–80.
96. For my initial review of this literature, see Yoo, supra note 17, at 1935–48. For other
surveys, see BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 64–100, 141–44 (1992);
Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 304–17
(1991).
97. Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in
Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952).
98. See Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices in Television Markets, 91
Q.J. ECON. 15 (1977); Jerome Rothenberg, Consumer Sovereignty and the Economics of TV
Programming, 4 STUD. PUB. COMM. 45, 47–48 (1962); P. Wiles, Pilkington and the Theory of Value,
73 ECON. J. 183 (1963).
99. See Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054–55 (7th Cir. 1992).
100. See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 11, at 97 n.278; Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish
Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 94–95 (2001); Daniel L. Brenner,
Government Regulation of Radio Program Format Changes, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 56, 63–69 (1978); Jim
Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN.
L. REV. 1415, 1448, 1491 (1996); Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 11, at 868 & n.366; Spitzer,
supra note 96, at 305–12.
101. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 17 F.C.C.R. 18,503, 18,530 ¶ 82 & n.159 (2002); Revision of Radio
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The counterintuitive nature of Steiner’s argument can best be
understood through a simple numerical example. Steiner assumed that the
preferences of an audience in a particular local market could be divided
into four discrete program formats of the following sizes:
FIGURE 1. Steiner’s model of program diversity
Type 1
Audience size

210

Program format
Type 2 Type 3
75

50

Type 4
31

The first station to enter the market would naturally offer
programming targeted at the largest segment, Type 1. The second entrant
would face a choice of either offering programming targeted toward the
second largest segment, Type 2, in which case it would capture an audience
of 75, or duplicating the same type of programming offered by the first
entrant, in which case it would split the Type 1 audience with the first
entrant and capture an audience of 105. So long as half of the largest
segment exceeds the size of the second largest segment, the second entrant
will duplicate existing programming format.
The problem, from a welfare standpoint, is that the entire volume
captured by the second entrant consists of audience members who were
already being served by the first (an effect sometimes called “demand
diversion”). Because the first entrant was already serving these listeners,
entry by the second station creates no welfare benefits. If the second entrant
had instead offered Type 2 programming, its audience would have
consisted entirely of incremental listeners who were not previously being
served by the incumbent (an effect sometimes called “demand creation”).
Thus, to the extent that the audience captured by a new entrant results from
demand creation, entry is welfare enhancing. To the extent that the new
Rules and Policies, Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 7183, 7186 ¶ 21 (1994). See
also 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,740–42 ¶¶ 310–15 (discussing Steiner); Review
of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Further Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3550–51 ¶¶ 62–63 (1995) (same); Revision of Radio Rules and Policies,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 6 F.C.C.R. 3275 (1991) (same); Reexamination of the Commission’s
Cross-Interest Policy, Policy Statement, 4 F.C.C.R. 2208, 2212 ¶ 30 (1989) (same); Consideration of
the Operation of, and Possible Changes in, the Prime Time Access Rule, § 73.658(k) of the
Commission’s Rules, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 894 (1975) (Robinson, Comm’r,
dissenting) (same). But see 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,742 ¶ 314 (declining to
embrace Steiner’s model).
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entrant’s audience results solely from demand diversion, it creates no
consumer benefits and instead simply wastes resources.
Steiner recognized that competitive entrants would target their
programming without taking into account whether the audience it captured
was the product of demand creation or demand diversion. As a result, they
may offer redundant programming notwithstanding the fact that doing so
creates no welfare benefits. In addition, to the extent that channel capacity
is limited, duplication of existing formats tends to crowd out other program
types.102 This logic suggests that a third entrant would offer programming
targeted toward Type 2,103 while a fourth entrant would again duplicate
Type 1 programming.104 Type 3 programming would not appear until the
arrival of the sixth station, and Type 4 until the arrival of the tenth.105
The tendency toward duplication of program types disappears,
however, if the entrants are jointly owned.106 Unlike a competitive entrant,
a monopolist would consider whether the revenue captured by an additional
station resulted from demand creation or from demand diversion. In fact, a
monopolist controlling all stations would focus solely on generating new
audiences and would eschew any strategy that simply cannibalized listeners
from its other stations.
Stated in the terms of the numerical hypothetical described above, if
the initial two entrants were jointly owned, the owner would not use both
stations to target Type 1, since the audience captured by the second station
would come entirely at the expense of the first. Instead, the owner would
direct each successive station at a different market segment. Thus, Steiner
was able to show that, under his assumptions, monopoly control of a local
radio market can satisfy more viewers and yield greater program diversity
than can competition.107
Steiner’s analysis also has implications for program quality. In the
case of competitive entry, multiple entrants divide the revenue generated by
any particular program type. In the case of monopolistic control of a local
radio market, each audience segment is served by precisely one station.
Therefore, each station under the monopoly solution will capture more
102. See Beebe, supra note 98, at 23, 30–31; Rothenberg, supra note 98, at 48.
103. The third entrant would find that the size of the second largest segment (75) exceeds the
audience it would capture if it divided the largest segment with the two other entrants (70).
104. The fourth entrant would find that one-third of the Type 1 audience (70) would still be larger
than half of the Type 2 audience (37.5) or the entirety of the Type 3 audience (50).
105. See Steiner, supra note 97, at 200.
106. See id. at 206–07; Wiles, supra note 98, at 188.
107. Steiner, supra note 97, at 206–07.
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revenue than under competition. To the extent that quality correlates with
program cost, monopoly provision should cause program quality to
increase.108
b. Limitations of Steiner Models
Steiner models suffer from a number of limitations, some well
recognized, other less so. Theorists building on Steiner’s work have
pointed out that the correlation between monopoly and program diversity
that he found depends on a host of assumptions: the particular skewness
found in the distribution of demand, the willingness of audiences to view
second-choice programming, the magnitude and variability of program
cost, and the availability of excess channel capacity.109 These limitations
have been analyzed elsewhere110 and those arguments will not be repeated
here.
Other fundamental limitations to Steiner’s analysis have largely gone
unnoticed. For example, his approach necessarily presupposes that
programming can be segregated into one of several discrete formats.111
Experience has shown that radio and television programming defies easy
categorization. Consider the popular “oldies” radio format that, in a fairly
short period, multiplied from one format to several, as different stations
targeted listeners of different ages. The FCC has recognized that radio and
television formats are far too dynamic and varied to be classified in such a
simple, categorical manner, and the Supreme Court has given its blessing to
this conclusion.112
Equally problematic is Steiner’s assumption that entry by an
additional station into an occupied format simply duplicates existing
programming.113 In effect, he assumes that, within any particular format,
programming is completely fungible. The most casual perusal of the radio
market falsifies this assumption––the popularity of radio stations offering
108. See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 96, at 144–48. The extent to which increased revenue
will result in increased expenditures on programming depends on the elasticity of demand. Bruce Owen
and Steven Wildman note the theoretical possibility that competitive entry might stimulate the
production of higher-quality programming. See id. at 85. In either scenario, governmental restrictions
on horizontal concentration would have a direct impact on program quality.
109. See Beebe, supra note 98, at 23–31; Rothenberg, supra note 98, at 49–50.
110. See Yoo, supra note 17, at 1938–42.
111. For similar efforts, see Edward Greenberg & Harold J. Barnett, TV Program Diversity—New
Evidence and Old Theories, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 89, 90 (1971); Levin, supra note 29, at 84–87.
112. See Development of Policy re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 861–63 ¶¶ 11–15 (1976) [hereinafter Format
Policy Statement], aff’d sub nom. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
113. See Steiner, supra note 97, at 199. See also id. at 206 (relaxing this assumption).
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the same format category varies widely.114 Stations that appear to be
offering the same type of programming typically provide very different
levels of utility to listeners. This suggests that program types might be
better understood not as falling into discrete categories, but rather as
occupying a position along a spectrum of program characteristics. Revising
the model of program selection in this manner would call into question the
assumption that duplication of an existing program type by a new entrant
necessarily yields no welfare benefit, since it remains possible that a new
entrant might attract new listeners or provide greater satisfaction to
members of the audience who were already listening.115
Finally, Steiner’s approach measured welfare through a voting model
that simply counted the number of viewers in any audience.116 The inability
of such voting-oriented models to take intensity of preferences into account
limits their ability to assess economic welfare properly.117 In addition,
omitting any aspect of price competition eliminates the possibility that
welfare gains created by increased program diversity might be offset by
welfare losses incurred through the exercise of oligopoly power in a
concentrated market. Although Steiner’s voting model might have made
sense at a time when radio broadcasters could not typically charge for their
programs,118 it makes less sense in a world in which fee-based radio and
television services are a reality.
These weaknesses of the Steiner model indicate that local media
markets might be better analyzed under the more general model of spatial
competition pioneered by Harold Hotelling. This model assumes that
producers compete by occupying a position along a continuous product
spectrum, rather than by placing themselves into one of a discrete number
of product categories.119 The legal literature120 and the FCC have largely
overlooked these models.121
114. See Format Policy Statement, supra note 112, at 863–64 ¶ 18.
115. See Steiner, supra note 97, at 204.
116. See id. at 196–97.
117. See id. at 197.
118. See id. at 198.
119. See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929). For a general
introduction to spatial competition models, see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 241–46 (2004). For applications to television programming, see
Eli M. Noam, A Public and Private-Choice Model of Broadcasting, 55 PUB. CHOICE 163 (1987);
Alessandro Vaglio, A Model of the Audience for TV Broadcasting: Implications for Advertising
Competition and Regulation, 42 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALI
33 (1995); David Waterman, Diversity and Quality of Information Products in a Monopolistically
Competitive Industry, 4 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 291 (1991).
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I hope to offer a more complete application of spatial competition
models to the FCC’s media ownership regulations in my future work. For
now, it suffices to note that spatial models suggest that the relationship
between horizontal concentration and welfare may be more complex than
Steiner’s model suggests. First, Hotelling-style spatial competition
acknowledges that entry by a similar product can yield welfare benefits,
both by capturing incremental demand and by allowing some audience
members who were already viewing to consume programming that offers a
better fit with their ideal preferences. These models also reflect how joint
ownership can cause welfare to increase by inducing firms to pay attention
to whether their revenue is the product of demand creation or demand
diversion.122 Finally, the more sophisticated spatial models take into
account the fact that any economic benefits resulting from a monopolist’s
refusal to duplicate existing programming must be offset by the welfare
losses associated with the reduction in price competition.123
Spatial models thus provide reason to be somewhat skeptical of
Steiner’s simplistic conclusion that market concentration necessarily
promotes greater program variety as well as the supposition advanced by
many commentators that media concentration invariably reduces the
diversity of media content.124 Although monopolists’ unwillingness to
cannibalize audiences from their own stations may tend to promote product
diversity, their willingness to withdraw stations from the market and their
tendency to charge supercompetitive prices works in the opposite direction.
Which of these two countervailing effects dominates is an empirical
question that cannot be determined a priori. Formal models have shown
that either too much or too little program diversity may exist in equilibrium
120. The only discussion of any significance appearing in the law review literature is Spitzer,
supra note 96, at 314–16.
121. The only FCC reference to this literature of which I am aware is the bare citation of a paper
by Richard Schmalensee that employed a spatial competition model. See Review of the Commission’s
Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R.
3524, 3551 n.81 (1995).
122. See JOHN BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRODUCT
DIFFERENTIATION 57 (1991); Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets, 16
RAND J. ECON. 380, 388–89 (1985); Roger W. Koenker & Martin K. Perry, Product Differentiation,
Monopolistic Competition, and Public Policy, 12 BELL J. ECON. 217, 226–27 (1981); N. Gregory
Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. ECON. 48, 49, 52,
54–55 (1986).
123. See JEFFREY CHURCH & ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 395–404 (2000); B.
Curtis Eaton & Myrna Holtz Wooders, Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition, 16
RAND J. ECON. 282 (1985); Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL
J. ECON. 141, 143–45 (1979).
124. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.

YOOBAKE19.DOC

2005]

3/28/2005 4:30 PM

ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP

699

and that monopoly may or may not produce greater program diversity or
generate greater economic benefits.125 Attempts to resolve this question
empirically have yielded mixed results. While one leading study concluded
that increases in horizontal concentration in local radio markets tended to
increase program diversity,126 other studies have confirmed the tendency
toward duplication and underscored the critical role played by channel
capacity.127 Yet another study of the television industry focusing on
product differentiation concluded that program variety approached optimal
levels,128 while another study of the radio industry found excess entry.129
Still other studies have drawn somewhat different conclusions.130
Fortunately, for the purposes of this Article, the precise relationship
between market concentration and program diversity need not be resolved.
It is sufficient to show that a relationship does exist, even if the direction
and magnitude of the effect remain somewhat uncertain.131 This
relationship reveals that the degree of horizontal concentration permitted
under current media ownership regulations will have a direct impact on
media content.
125. See ANDERSON & COATE, supra note 42, at 19–23.
126. See Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence
from Radio Broadcasting, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1009 (2001).
127. See August E. Grant, The Promise Fulfilled? An Empirical Analysis of Program Diversity on
Television, 7 J. MEDIA ECON. 51, 62 (1994); Robert P. Rogers & John R. Woodbury, Market Structure,
Program Diversity, and Radio Audience Size, 14 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 81 (1996).
128. See Ronald L. Goettler & Ron Shachar, Spatial Competition in the Network Television
Industry, 32 RAND J. ECON. 624 (2001).
129. See Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio
Broadcasting, 30 RAND J. ECON. 397 (1999). This study acknowledged, however, that the radio
industry is somewhat unusual in that it serves two different groups of customers—advertisers and
listeners—only one of which (advertisers) is able to make direct payments for programming. What
appears to be excess entry when measured solely in terms of benefits to advertisers may in fact be
efficient when measured in terms of both advertisers and listeners. Id. at 412–14.
130. See 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,740–42 ¶¶ 310–315 (reviewing the
literature).
131. As Professor Baker points out, my conclusion that horizontal concentration has an
ambiguous impact on media content is not completely consistent with my overarching claim that the
forms of architectural censorship I have identified reduce the quantity, quality, and diversity of media
programming. See Baker, supra note 13, at 739–740. I concede that my attempt to reduce the central
thesis of this Article into a pithy catchphrase represents something of an overstatement in this limited
respect. That said, I do believe that my summation does accurately reflect the negative impact that the
other forms of architectural censorship I have identified have on media content. Furthermore, the fact
remains that horizontal restrictions are having a direct effect on the content of media speech regardless
of the direction of the effect. The fact that governmental actions are altering program content should
raise First Amendment concerns regardless of the precise nature of the effect.
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2. The Role of Efficiencies from Horizontal Integration
Horizontal integration also affects program diversity by allowing
media groups to realize cost efficiencies. Horizontal integration enables
entities that own multiple stations to economize on costs, which in turn can
support increases in the quantity, quality, and diversity of programming
offered by allowing the media industry to invest a larger proportion of its
revenue in program production. The FCC has repeatedly recognized that
local crossownership provides precisely these benefits by allowing the
station owner to combine administrative, programming, sales, marketing,
promotion, and production costs.132 Indeed, some data suggest that
crossownership can reduce the cost of these functions by 30% to 35%.133
In addition, crossownership can help newspapers realize more
efficient use of their efforts to collect local news. Like all forms of
television and radio programming, local news bears many of the classic
indicia of a pure public good. In particular, consumption of local news is
nonrivalrous, in that consumption of it by one person does not reduce the
supply available for others. In economic terms, this is usually modeled by
assuming that once a media entity has incurred the fixed costs associated
with gathering the news, the marginal cost of sharing with others is zero.
Thus, once the costs of collecting the local news have been incurred,
economic success depends on disseminating that information to as many
paying customers as possible.134 Thus, as a theoretical matter, the greater
return on investment made possible by crossownership may enable media
outlets to provide more diverse programming.135 Empirical studies have
largely borne this out.136
132. See Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Report
and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,920–22 ¶¶ 34–36 (1999); Radio Rules and Policies, supra note 78, at
2760–61 ¶ 11, 2774 ¶ 37; 1989 Second Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 78, at 1746–47 ¶¶ 39–51;
1989 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 75, at 1727 ¶ 36.
133. Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission’s Rules, the Broadcast Multiple
Ownership Rules, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 F.C.C.R. 1138, 1140–41 ¶ 20 (1987).
134. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1657–59.
135. See 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,678 ¶¶ 155–156, 13,753–61 ¶¶ 342–
358, 13,772–73 ¶¶ 382–385; 1989 Second Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 78, at 1747 ¶ 44.
136. See John C. Busterna, Television Station Ownership Effects on Programming and Idea
Diversity: Baseline Data, 1 J. MEDIA ECON. 63 (1988); Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., George S. Ford &
Thomas Koutsky, Market Power in Radio Markets: An Empirical Analysis of Local and National
Concentration, 43 J.L. & ECON. 157, 180 (2000); David Pritchard, A Tale of Three Cities: “Diverse
and Antagonistic” Information in Situations of Local Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 31 (2001). These studies largely corroborated earlier research finding that media ownership
had little to no impact on the diversity of program content. See 1975 Multiple Ownership Order, supra
note 71, at 1073 ¶ 97 (noting that empirical studies of the impact of ownership on content were
“inconclusive”); WALTER S. BAER, HENRY GELLER, JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & KAREN B. POSSNER,
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It is thus clear that the degree of horizontal integration permitted can
have a fairly dramatic impact on the quantity, quality, and diversity of
speech. Horizontal ownership restrictions represent a little-recognized, but
important, form of architectural censorship.
D. RESTRICTIONS ON VERTICAL INTEGRATION
The FCC has long been concerned that vertical integration in the radio
and television industry would harm competition.137 The focus has been on
whether vertical integration or vertical contractual agreements can allow a
firm to use a dominant position in one market (called the primary market)
to harm competition in another market (called the secondary market).
These concerns animated the FCC’s first major regulatory initiative,
commonly known as the Chain Broadcasting Rules. The Rules were driven
by the belief that the then-existing triopoly of radio networks was hindering
the emergence of competition from new networks138 and was inhibiting
local control of the programming carried by any particular station.139 As a
result, the Chain Broadcasting Rules strictly limited radio networks’ ability
to own broadcast stations140 and restricted the networks’ ability to use
affiliation agreements to limit the autonomy of local stations.141 The
Supreme Court sustained the Rules in the seminal decision on broadcast
CONCENTRATION OF MASS MEDIA OWNERSHIP: ASSESSING THE STATE OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 121–
40 (1974) (surveying the empirical literature and concluding that crossownership plays a “minor role, if
any” in influencing media content); STANLEY M. BESEN & LELAND L. JOHNSON, REGULATION OF
MEDIA OWNERSHIP BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: AN ASSESSMENT 28–31, 52,
57–59 (1984) (reviewing the empirical literature and concluding that crossownership has no clear
impact on program diversity); Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on Content: Does It
Matter?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 755, 770 (1995) (“Multiple studies have concurred that
programming differences related to group ownership are mixed and, even at that, are quite small.”
(footnote omitted)).
137. For a more detailed review of the history and theory of the FCC’s regulation of vertical
integration in the television industry, see Yoo, supra note 45, at 181–248. The primary focus of this
discussion is downstream vertical integration by television and radio networks. It bears mentioning that
at times the FCC has also regulated upstream vertical integration by networks into program supply. For
critiques of the now-notorious and defunct “prime time access rule” (“PTAR”) and the financial interest
and syndication rules (“finsyn”), see THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 72–74, 99–100 (1994); Chen, supra note 100, at 1454–58.
138. See FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, supra note 13, at 51, 59, 66.
139. Id. at 64–65.
140. Specifically, the FCC prohibited networks from owning more than one station in any market
and from owning any stations in markets in which competition was substantially restrained. See id. at
92, repealed in part by Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting,
Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 4538, 4540 ¶ 10 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Chain Broadcasting Order].
This rule was overshadowed by the national television station ownership limits discussed below.
141. FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, supra note 13, at 51–66.
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regulation, NBC v. United States.142 The FCC subsequently extended the
Chain Broadcasting Rules to television in 1946.143 In time, the FCC would
repeal them with respect to radio144 and roll back some of the restrictions
with respect to television as well.145 Certain television-related provisions
still remain in effect.146
Congress has also taken steps to limit vertical integration in the cable
industry.147 The “channel occupancy” provision authorized the FCC to
limit the channel capacity that cable operators could devote to their
vertically affiliated networks.148 Congress also enacted a series of access
requirements designed to protect against the dangers of vertical integration.
For example, the leased access provision requires all cable systems with
more than thirty-five channels to set aside part of their channel capacity for
use by unaffiliated programmers.149 The program access provisions prevent
vertically integrated programmers from discriminating against unaffiliated
operators150 or from entering into exclusive dealing contracts.151 Most
142. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
143. Amendment to Part 3 of the Commission’s Rules, 11 Fed. Reg. 33 (F.C.C. Jan. 1, 1946).
144. Review of Commission Rules and Regulatory Policies Concerning Network Broadcasting by
Standard (AM) and FM Broadcast Stations, Report, Statement of Policy, and Order, 63 F.C.C.2d 674
(1977).
145. See 1995 Chain Broadcasting Order, supra note 140; Review of Rules and Policies
Concerning Network Broadcasting by Television Stations: Elimination or Modification of Section
73.658(c) of the Commission’s Rules, Report and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2755 (1989).
146. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2004). A proposal to repeal these remaining restrictions has been
pending without action since 1995. See Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing
Programming Practices of Broadcast Television Networks and Affiliates, Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 11,951 (1995).
147. Even before Congress acted, the FCC placed some limits on vertical integration in the cable
industry when it promulgated regulations prohibiting national television networks from holding
ownership stakes in cable operators. See Community Antenna Order, supra note 72, at 821 ¶ 15. The
FCC relaxed this restriction in 1992. See Order to Eliminate the Prohibition on Common Ownership,
supra note 78. Congress abolished it altogether in 1996. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, § 202(f)(1), 106 Stat. 56, 111.
148. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (2000). The FCC set this limit at 40% of the operators’ channel
capacity. Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, Second Report and Order, 8
F.C.C.R. 8565, 8592–96 ¶¶ 64–70 (1993). The channel occupancy limit applied only to the first
seventy-five channels of any cable operator’s capacity. Channel capacity in excess of seventy-five
channels was not subject to the limit. Id. at 8601–02 ¶ 84. The D.C. Circuit overturned the 40% limit.
See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1137–39 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
149. The amount of channel capacity that must be set aside varies from 10% to 15%, depending
on the size of the cable operator. 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1). Enactment of this statute overturned a previous
Supreme Court decision holding that the FCC lacked the authority to mandate leased access. See FCC
v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
150. 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(B).
151. Id. § 548 (c)(2).

YOOBAKE19.DOC

2005]

3/28/2005 4:30 PM

ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP

703

importantly, Congress enacted the must-carry provisions, requiring cable
operators to provide free carriage to all full-power television stations
broadcasting in their service area.152 Although enacted in part to preserve
horizontal competition in local advertising markets,153 must-carry was also
intended to guard against vertical integration.154
In addition, the FCC has historically limited the number of television
and radio stations that any one entity can own nationwide.155 It justified
these restrictions with the need to foster competition,156 the need to
promote a diversity of sources,157 and the desire to encourage local
initiative.158 Congress eventually eliminated the national station ownership
limits for radio and amended the national television station ownership limit
to permit ownership of any number of television stations reaching less than
152. Id. §§ 534, 535.
153. See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 200–01 (1997).
154. See id. at 198–99 (justifying must-carry in part on testimony indicating that vertical
integration gives “cable operators . . . an incentive to drop local broadcasters and to favor affiliated
programmers”). See also Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102385, § 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460–61 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534–535) (finding that
vertical integration in the cable industry has given “cable operators . . . the incentive and ability to favor
their affiliated programmers” and “could make it more difficult for noncable-affiliated programmers to
secure carriage on cable systems”); S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 25 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1133, 1158 (noting that “vertical integration gives cable operators the incentive and ability to favor their
affiliated programming services” and might lead a cable operator to refuse to carry unaffiliated
programmers).
155. The FCC initially set the national cap for television at three stations. See Rules and
Regulations Governing Experimental Television Broadcast Stations, § 4.226, 6 Fed. Reg. 2283, 2284–
85 (F.C.C. May 6, 1941). The national cap for radio was set at five stations. See Multiple Ownership, 9
Fed. Reg. 5442 (F.C.C. May 23, 1944). By 1954, a series of subsequent amendments eventually turned
both the national radio and television station ownership limits into what became known as a “Rule of
Seven.” See 1953 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 13, at 291 (limiting any one owner to five
television stations and seven radio stations nationwide); Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules,
Report and Order, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954) (increasing the national limit for television from five to seven
stations so long as two stations were UHF). The Rule of Seven was sustained against a judicial
challenge by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). The limit
was later liberalized into a “Rule of Twelve.” See Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections
73.35, 73.240 & 73.636] of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM &
Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Multiple
Ownership Order] (authorizing group ownership of up to twelve stations), on reconsideration, 100
F.C.C.2d 74 (1985) (adding the additional requirement that the twelve-station group reach no more than
25% of the national audience).
156. See Storer Broad., 351 U.S. at 203 (concluding that the FCC’s public interest mandate
requires it to “assure fair opportunity for open competition in the use of broadcasting facilities”); 1984
Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 155, at 38–46 ¶¶ 64–86, 50–51 ¶¶ 97–99
157. See Storer Broad., 351 U.S. at 203; 6 FCC ANN. REP. 68 (1941); 1984 Multiple Ownership
Order, supra note 155, at 24–38 ¶¶ 24–63.
158. See 6 FCC ANN. REP. 68 (1941).
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35% of the national audience.159 Congress also passed legislation
authorizing the FCC to establish a limit on the number of cable subscribers
that any one company can reach nationwide.160 The FCC eventually set that
limit at 30%.161
The first round of judicial challenges to these provisions proved
unsuccessful.162 More recent decisions have exhibited the courts’ greater
willingness to invalidate vertical ownership restrictions. In Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FCC,163 the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 30% cable
subscriber limit set by the FCC based on a failure to implement the
provision in the manner prescribed by Congress.164 The court also struck
down the FCC’s channel occupancy limit on First Amendment grounds.165
Furthermore, in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,166 the D.C. Circuit
overturned the FCC’s decision not to eliminate the national television
station ownership cap during its first biennial review.167 The court held that
159. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c), 110 Stat. 56, 110 (codified
as amended at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (2004)).
160. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (2000).
161. Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, Second Report and Order, 8
F.C.C.R. 8565, 8576–79 ¶¶ 24–29 (1993) (setting this limit at 30% of all nationwide subscribers). Cable
systems were allowed to reach up to 35% of nationwide cable homes provided that such additional
cable systems were minority-controlled. Id. at 8578–79 ¶ 28. After seeking additional comment, the
FCC subsequently reaffirmed these limits. See Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Horizontal Ownership Limits, Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R.
14,462, 14,467–83 ¶¶ 9–51 (1998); Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Horizontal Ownership Limits, Third Report and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 19,098, 19,113–27 ¶¶ 36–70 (1999).
162. See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (sustaining must-carry against a facial challenge); Time
Warner Entm’t Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (sustaining the subscriber limit and
the channel occupancy provision against a facial challenge); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d
957, 967–71, 977–79 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (sustaining the leased access and vertically integrated
programmer provisions against a facial challenge). Interestingly, the district court did initially sustain a
facial challenge to the subscriber limit provision, only to see its decision overturned on appeal. See
Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1993), rev’d sub nom. Time
Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 211 F.3d at 1316–20.
163. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
164. Id. at 1133–36.
165. Id. at 1137–39. Interestingly, the distinction seems to turn on the fact that Sinclair
Broadcasting Group and Fox Television Stations involved broadcasting and thus were only held to
rational basis scrutiny, whereas Time Warner involved regulation of the cable industry and thus was
held to intermediate scrutiny. On the problematic nature of this distinction, see infra Part II.C.
166. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d
537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
167. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Biennial Review Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, 11,072–75 ¶¶ 25–30 (2000).
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refusal to repeal the rule violated both the Administrative Procedure Act
and the FCC’s obligation under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to
“repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public
interest.”168 The FCC responded by revising the national television station
ownership rule to permit companies to own any number of stations so long
as the station group could reach no more than 45% of the nation’s
television households.169 Again, the FCC analyzed the issues in terms of
the policy goals of competition, diversity, and localism, placing primary
reliance on localism considerations.170 The ensuing controversy over the
decision led Congress to enact legislation setting the national television
station ownership cap at 39% and exempting the restriction from
mandatory periodic review by the FCC.171
The national television station ownership and cable subscriber limits
are often misconstrued as being horizontal in focus.172 Properly evaluated,
horizontal restrictions bar mergers among direct competitors who would
otherwise be serving the same customers. In the case of U.S. media
regulation, excess horizontal concentration is prevented by the rules
prohibiting crossownership of media outlets in the same city described in
the preceding subsection. The national television station ownership and
cable subscriber limits are more properly regarded as prohibiting joint
ownership of television stations or cable systems in different cities. Even
though these jointly owned properties occupy the same product market,
their geographic markets are distinct, and thus they do not compete with
one another. In other words, allowing a television station operating in New
York City to merge with one operating in Los Angeles does not involve a
merger between direct competitors and does not have any impact on
options available to any viewer.
168. Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1040–49.
169. 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,842–45 ¶¶ 578–84.
170. Id. at 13,818–42 ¶¶ 508–578.
171. Consolidated Appropriation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100.
Setting the national television ownership cap at 39% had the practical advantage of making it
unnecessary for Fox and Viacom to divest the television stations they had acquired in excess of the
previous 35% cap pursuant to temporary waivers granted by the FCC. Making it possible for Fox and
Viacom to retain these stations removed much of the political impetus for further liberalization of the
national ownership cap.
172. See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 32–33 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1165–66
(referring to the growth of multiple system operators as “horizontal integration” and “horizontal
concentration”); Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 197 (1997) (referring to the growth of multiple system
operators as “[h]orizontal concentration”); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (referring to the subscriber limit provision as a “horizontal” restriction).
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Although group ownership of broadcast stations does not enhance
horizontal market power with respect to viewers, it may enhance vertical
market power by increasing the group’s bargaining leverage with respect to
networks and other program suppliers. As a result, the national television
and radio ownership restrictions are more properly regarded as protecting
against vertical market power rather than horizontal market power.173
Concerns about vertical integration are also evident in the furor that
has surrounded many recent mega-mergers in the television industry,
including Disney’s acquisition of ABC, Viacom’s merger with CBS, Time
Warner’s acquisition of Turner Broadcasting, and America Online’s
subsequent acquisition of Time Warner. Each merger was accompanied by
a spate of commentary warning of dire consequences should the mergers be
permitted.174
1. Structural Preconditions Implicit in Vertical Integration Theory
The nature of the economic threat posed by vertical integration has
long been one of the most hotly contested issues in competition policy.175
Although proponents of the leading schools of antitrust law and economics
have often disagreed sharply over the extent to which vertical integration
can harm competition, they do share common ground on some basic
points.176 Both sides in the debate agree that certain structural
preconditions must be satisfied before vertical integration can pose a threat
to competition. All of the vertical integration models explicitly or implicitly
acknowledge that the primary market must be concentrated before vertical
integration can harm competition. If this precondition is not met, the
allegedly anticompetitive firm has no dominant position to use as leverage.
Furthermore, the secondary market must be protected by barriers to entry if
attempts to reduce competition in the secondary market are to have any
hope of success. In addition, even if these structural preconditions are met,
173. Yoo, supra note 45, at 219, 222.
174. See, e.g., John H. Barton, The International Video Industry: Principles for Vertical
Agreements and Integration, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 67 (2004); Symposium, Viacom-CBS
Merger, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 499 (2000); Patrick M. Cox, Note, What Goes Up Must Come Down:
Grounding the Dizzying Height of Vertical Mergers in the Entertainment Industry, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
261 (1996).
175. See, e.g., Andy C.M. Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 575 (1999) (“Few subjects in American antitrust law have undergone as many
changes and generated as much debate among economists and lawyers as the regulation of vertical
arrangements.”).
176. The discussion that follows draws on the more complete analysis appearing in Yoo, supra
note 45, at 187–205.
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both approaches acknowledge the possibility that efficiencies may exist
that nonetheless make vertical integration economically desirable.
In fact, these structural preconditions have become so much a part of
the conventional wisdom that they are incorporated into guidelines
employed by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission to
evaluate the impact of vertical mergers on competition.177 These guidelines
explicitly acknowledge that vertical mergers are unlikely to harm
competition unless the primary market is concentrated.178 The measure of
market concentration employed by the guidelines is the HirschmanHerfindahl Index (“HHI”), which is calculated by squaring the market
share of each competitor and then summing the resulting numbers. For
example, a market of four firms with market shares of 30%, 30%, 20%, and
20% would have an HHI of 2600.179 The result is a continuum that situates
the concentration of a market on a scale from 0 (in the case of complete
market deconcentration) to 10,000 (in the case of monopoly). When the
post-merger HHI of the primary market is below 1800, vertical integration
is considered unproblematic.180 This standard is somewhat more lenient
than that applied to horizontal mergers, which are more likely to create
competitive problems.181 The D.C. Circuit recognized the importance of
these structural preconditions in striking down the FCC’s attempt to
implement the channel occupancy provision enacted by Congress.182
177. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 4.212, 4.213, 4.221,
4.24 (promulgated in 1984 and reaffirmed in 1992 and 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/2614.pdf.
178. Id. § 4.213.
179. 302 + 302 + 202 + 202 = 900 + 900 + 400 + 400 = 2600.
180. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 177, § 4.213. See also id. § 4.131 (using the 1800 HHI
threshold for determining when vertical integration can harm potential competition); id. § 4.221 (using
the 1800 HHI threshold for determining when vertical integration can facilitate collusion).
181. Id. § 4.0. Unlike vertical mergers, which are thought to raise competitive problems only if the
post-merger HHI exceeds 1800, horizontal mergers are open to challenge even when post-merger HHI
is as low as 1000. Specifically, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines classify markets in which the postmerger HHI is between 1000 and 1800 as “moderately concentrated.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.51(b), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/horiz_book/ 15.html (Apr. 8, 1997). Horizontal mergers in markets that fall within
this range “potentially raise significant competitive concerns” and may be subject to challenge if they
increase HHI by more than 100 points. Id. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines treat markets in which the
post-merger HHI exceeds 1800 as “highly concentrated.” Id. § 1.51(c). In these markets, mergers that
raise post-merger HHI by more than 50 points “potentially raise significant competitive concerns” and
may be challenged. Mergers that raise post-merger HHI 100 points are “presumed . . . to create or
enhance market power or facilitate its exercise” and are likely to be challenged. Id.
182. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1138–39 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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2. Applying the Structural Preconditions to the Television Industry
Determining whether a particular market is concentrated depends on
proper market definition, which in turn requires the identification of the
relevant product and geographic markets. The relevant market is best
understood if the television industry is viewed as the multilevel chain of
distribution depicted in Figure 2.183 The uppermost level is occupied by the
networks and movie studios that create television programs. The
intermediate level is occupied by local television stations and local cable
operators, who acquire programming from program suppliers and deliver
them locally. The bottommost level is occupied by end users, who obtain
television service from local television stations and cable operators.
Many mistakenly assume that the relevant market is the one in which
households obtain television programming from broadcast stations and
cable operators (denoted in the figure by the letter B). B is a local market
because, until recently, households could only obtain television from an
outlet located within their local community. In addition, because the
number of entities from which households could obtain television
programming has historically been rather limited, if this were the relevant
market, it would appear to be sufficiently concentrated to make vertical
integration a real anticompetitive threat.184
183. This is a somewhat simplified version of the description of the industry advanced in Yoo,
supra note 45, at 182–83, 220–21. The more complex analysis presented in that paper disaggregated the
first stage depicted in Figure 2 into two different stages rather than lumping program producers and
television networks into the same category. Because that distinction is not as central to the argument
presented here, the basic framework can be simplified in this manner without any loss of analytic
power.
184. It is unclear whether this is still true. The arrival of DBS as a significant multichannel video
programming distributor (“MVPD”) has made the market for local delivery of television signals much
more competitive. The FCC’s most recent data indicate that as of June 2004, DBS had captured over
25% of the MVPD market. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, FCC 05-13, slip op. at 38–39 ¶ 54, 115
tbl.B-1 (F.C.C. Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Eleventh Annual Report on Video Competition], available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-13A1.pdf. This exceeds the 15% threshold
established by Congress for determining when a cable operator faces effective competition from other
MVPDs. See 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
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FIGURE 2. Vertical chain of production in the television industry
Television Networks and
Program Providers

A
Local Television Stations
and Cable Operators

B
Households
The problem with this analysis is that limits on the number of viewers
that one station or cable operator group can reach nationwide have no
impact whatsoever on the degree of market concentration in any local
market. This fundamental insight can be seen most clearly by conducting
the following thought experiment. Suppose the FCC banned vertical
integration in the television industry altogether and required every
television station owner and cable operator to divest any ownership
interests in any network or program supplier. Would doing so decrease the
ability of television stations and cable operators to exercise market power
in market B? Clearly, the answer is no. Market power in B exists by virtue
of the relatively small number of options any particular household has for
obtaining television service. Preventing television stations and cable
operators from holding ownership interests in networks would not increase
or decrease the number of those options one iota. Forcing owners of
television stations and cable operators to sell their proprietary interests in
television programming would have no impact on market power in market
B.
Vertical disintegration could potentially have an impact on market A,
the upstream market in which local television stations and cable operators
meet networks and program suppliers. The economics of producing
television programming (particularly the fact that it requires the incurrence
of substantial up-front costs) leaves program producers vulnerable to
strategic behavior by local television stations and cable operators.
Restrictions on the number of television stations and cable operators one
entity can own nationwide has the inevitable effect of reducing program
producers’ ability to use vertical integration or vertical contractual
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arrangements to internalize these risks.185 In addition, the national
television station ownership and cable subscriber limits also affect the
relative bargaining power of the players in market A by ensuring that the
networks and other program suppliers negotiate with station and cable
operator groups that represent smaller proportions of the national audience.
The proper focus, then, is on market A, in which television stations
and cable operators bargain with networks and program suppliers. On
reflection, it becomes clear that the geographic scope of this market is
national, not local. Even in the extreme case, where the local cable operator
possesses monopoly power over viewers in a particular city, that operator is
unlikely to be able to exert any significant market power against a
television network that can reach a sufficient number of other viewers
located elsewhere in the nation. A program producer cares less about
whether it is able to reach viewers in any particular city and more about
how much of the national market it is able to access. In other words, it is
the network’s national reach, not its local reach, that matters. The network
would, of course, prefer to reach all viewers nationwide. That it may be
unable to reach certain customers is of no greater concern than it would be
to manufacturers of particular brands of cars, shoes, or other conventional
goods who are unable to gain access to the entire country. Their inability to
reach customers in any particular geographic area does not threaten
competition so long as they are able to obtain access to a sufficient number
of customers located elsewhere. The proper question is not whether local
television stations and cable operators wield market power in the local
market for television viewers in any particular city, but rather whether
groups of television stations and local cable systems possess sufficient
market power to harm competition in the nationwide market for obtaining
television content.
When viewed in this manner, it becomes relatively clear that the
relevant primary market (as in the national market for household delivery
of television programming) is unconcentrated. Consider, for example, the
current national television station ownership rule, which prohibits
television station groups that can reach more than 39% of the U.S.
television audience.186 It would be a mistake to assume that this limit
would permit a television station group to control 39% of the market. This
is because no broadcast network is able to capture more than 15% of the
185.
186.

See Yoo, supra note 45, at 192–200, 213–17, 232–37.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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potential audience that it reaches.187 Thus, even if a group were able to
reach 39% of the U.S. market, it would only be able to capture less than
one sixth of those viewers. Setting the national audience cap at 39%
effectively guarantees that no group of television stations will control more
than 6% of the national audience. In that case, there are at least sixteen
independent players bidding in the national market for television
programming, more than enough to ensure that the market remains
competitive.188 Indeed, these numbers suggest that there would have been
little danger setting the national audience cap at the 45% level that was
overturned by Congress.
Similar reasoning applies to the national cable subscriber limits. As of
June 2002, no multichannel video program distributor (“MVPD”)
controlled more than 15% of the national market, and the HHI of the total
market was 884.189 By June 2004, Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable
properties caused HHI to rise to 1097.190 Even this higher number falls well
below the enforcement threshold under the vertical merger guidelines.191
The level of concentration in the market for MVPDs is thus too diffuse to
give any MVPD market power sufficient to give rise to anticompetitive
concerns.192
187. For example, the highest ranked network during the November 2004 sweeps period (CBS),
was only able to capture 12% of adult viewers. See Jim Finkle, How Fall Played Out; CBS Triumphs,
ABC Improves, NBC Falters, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 6, 2004, at 14.
188. Even if the entire industry were composed of station groups of the largest size, the HHI
would be less than 700, well below the levels thought to raise competitive concerns.
189. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Ninth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 26,901, 26,913 tbl.B-3 (2002).
190. See Eleventh Annual Report on Video Competition, supra note 184, at 77 ¶ 144, 118 tbl.B-3,
119 tbl.B-4
191. In fact, the level of concentration in the market for MVPDs approaches the level of
nonenforcement under the more stringent guidelines governing horizontal mergers. Indeed, as the FCC
has noted, economic theory and empirical studies suggest that a market need not have more than five
participants of roughly equal size. See 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,731 ¶ 289 &
n.609 (citing economic commentary). This suggests that HHIs as high as 2000 might well be
unproblematic. That said, the Third Circuit rejected the FCC’s finding that five equal-sized competitors
would be sufficient to protect competition as arbitrary and capricious. See Prometheus Radio Project v.
FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 432–34 (3d Cir. 2004).
192. Professor Baker invokes Edward Chamberlin’s classic analysis of monopolistic competition
as support for his belief that media entities typically earn high operating profits. See Baker, supra note
13, at 737 & n.15. See also id. at 750–751. I offer a more complete analysis of the implications of
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition for media policy in Yoo, supra note 18, at 1602–28, 1633–36.
For the time being, it is sufficient to point out that Chamberlin himself did not believe that firms
engaged in monopolistic competition would earn sustainable economic profit. Although firms might
earn some profit in the short-run, entry by other firms selling similar products would eventually
dissipate any supercompetitive returns. See EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 83–85 (8th ed. 1969).
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Furthermore, an empirical analysis of the relevant secondary market—
comprised of television networks and program providers—reveals that it is
sufficiently unprotected by barriers to entry to obviate any anticompetitive
concerns. The FCC reports that the total number of television networks has
steadily increased, swelling from seventy networks in 1990193 to a total of
388 networks in 2004, with another seventy-eight networks in the planning
stages.194 In addition, the percentage of vertically integrated networks has
declined more or less steadily over the past decade.195
It is also likely that vertical integration in the radio and television
industry will yield sufficient efficiencies to justify condoning it. The FCC
has acknowledged that permitting broader network station ownership could
yield substantial managerial, technical, and operational efficiencies.196
Furthermore, because the creation of television programming typically
requires the incurrence of substantial sunk costs, program producers are
often vulnerable to hold-up, free riding, and other forms of strategic
behavior.197 The classic solution to such problems is through vertical
integration or through some form of vertical contractual restraint.198
Empirical studies confirm that, on balance, vertical integration in the cable
industry tends to be welfare enhancing.199
Chamberlin’s zero-profit result is in turn subject to several caveats. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 1607–09.
Subsequent research has shown that the general validity of Chamberlin’s zero-profit result depends on
the magnitude of the fixed costs relative to the overall market. See Yoo, supra note 119, at 240. Baker’s
observation would have had greater applicability during earlier eras, when television and radio markets
were protected by entry barriers. The emergence of alternative transmission technologies and new
networks has largely dissipated the danger of supercompetitive returns. See Yoo, supra note 18, at
1633–36. This suggests that media policy would be better served by focusing on lowering barriers to
entry, which in turn would require an abandonment of the commitment to fostering free radio and
television as well as lowering the barriers to vertical integration.
193. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Tenth Annual Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, 1691 tbl.8 (2004) [hereinafter Tenth Annual
Report on Video Competition].
194. Eleventh Annual Report on Video Competition, supra note 184, at 78 ¶ 145, 81 ¶ 152.
195. Tenth Annual Report on Video Competition, supra note 193, at 1690–91 ¶ 142 & tbl.8
(noting that the percentage of vertically integrated networks declined steadily from 50% in 1994 to 30%
in 2002 before rising slightly to 33% in 2003); Eleventh Annual Report on Video Competition, supra
note 184, at 78 ¶ 145 (noting that in 2004, the percentage of vertically integrated networks once again
declined to 23%).
196. See 1995 Chain Broadcasting Order, supra note 140, at 4540 ¶ 11.
197. See Yoo, supra note 45, at 213–17, 232–37.
198. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Lester G.
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
199. See Tasneem Chipty, Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the
Cable Television Industry, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 428, 430, 448–50 (2001).
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It thus appears that the structure of the television industry makes it
unlikely that vertical integration will harm competition, as demonstrated
eloquently by the failure of the Disney-ABC, Viacom-CBS, Time WarnerTurner Broadcasting, and AOL-Time Warner mergers to generate
significant anticompetitive harms. Instead, the existing regulations limiting
vertical integration only serve to prevent industry participants from
realizing the available efficiencies, which in turn reduces total quantity,
quality, and diversity of speech. As a result, the regulatory restraints on
vertical integration appear to represent still another form of architectural
censorship.
II. ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP’S IMMUNITY FROM
MEANINGFUL FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
Many of the extant structural regulations thus constitute forms of
architectural censorship that can have a dramatic impact on the quantity,
quality, and diversity of radio and television programming. As a result, one
would expect that the incidental impact structural regulation can have on
speech would be subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. This Part
analyzes the level of scrutiny to which structural regulation should be
subject under current First Amendment doctrine. Unfortunately, my
analysis suggests that the identified types of architectural censorship will
be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.
A. THE NATURE OF ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP
The impact that structural regulation can have on media content
should raise First Amendment concerns. Consider first the reductions in the
total quantity of television and radio programming. Regulations that
impede all forms of speech without regard to content still impair the free
flow of expression. That a regulation may have affected all viewpoints
equally does not change the fact that the reduction in opportunities for
expression effects a First Amendment harm, whether viewed from the
perspective of individual liberty or the proper functioning of the democratic
process.200 Scholars have also cautioned that media-specific regulations
allow special interest groups to redirect the regulatory process toward rent
200. See Benjamin, supra note 11, at 32–35; Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 128–31 (1981); Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban
Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779,
782–83 (1985).
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seeking at the expense of the general public.201 Moreover, the government
may not merely be an innocent bystander in the process of rent seeking by
politically powerful groups; it may actually be following a policy of “rent
extraction,” in which it deliberately restricts or threatens to restrict speech
to create a pool of rents that can then be redistributed through the
regulatory process.202
In addition, liberty-oriented theorists would find interference with
individual speakers’ editorial discretion to be a First Amendment harm,
even in the absence of evidence that particular content was favored or
disfavored. Access requirements are particularly problematic in this
regard.203 Tellingly, the Supreme Court has found preserving editorial
discretion to be an important First Amendment value even with respect to
broadcasting, the medium of communications that receives the lowest level
of constitutional protection.204 The Court has also repeatedly recognized
that cable operators’ selection of the content they transmit represents an
exercise of their free speech rights.205 Acknowledging that the interest in
editorial discretion may be offset by other considerations206 does not
change the fact that interference with a speaker’s liberty interest implicates
important First Amendment values.
201. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1, 61–67 (2001).
202. See Benjamin, supra note 11, at 35–36 (suggesting that regulators reduce the total amount of
spectrum-based speech in order to generate monopoly rents). For a general discussion on the process of
rent extraction, see FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION,
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
203. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). Cf. Martin H. Redish & Kirk J.
Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the
Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1114–17 (1999) (describing the cognitive and dignitary
harms associated with imposing affirmative content obligations on the media).
204. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673–75 (1998); FCC v. League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 379–80 (1984); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
105–11, 118–21, 124–25 (1973).
205. As the Court noted in the Turner I decision, “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the
principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal.”
Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). See also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991); City of
Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).
206. The Court has acknowledged that the interest in preserving broadcasters’ editorial discretion
must be balanced against the benefits to the public of being exposed to views that would otherwise be
barred from the airwaves. See Ark. Educ. Television, 523 U.S. at 673–74; League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. at 377–78; CBS, 412 U.S. at 101–02. With respect to cable, the Court has held that bottleneck
control of cable operators justifies permitting some restriction of their editorial discretion. Turner I, 512
U.S. at 656–57.
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Lastly, as I have detailed above, many of the FCC’s structural
restrictions have the unintended consequence of skewing media content
toward certain demographic groups and stifling the emergence of more
diverse programming. There can be little doubt that such content-specific
effects raise serious constitutional concerns.207
B. MINNEAPOLIS STAR AND THE SHORT-LIVED PROSPECT
OF STRICT SCRUTINY
Even though the structural regulations described above affect the
quantity and mix of media content in ways that implicate the First
Amendment, it is not completely clear what standard the courts would
apply when evaluating the constitutionality of these regulations. It is now
well established that regulations restricting speech on the basis of its
content are subject to strict scrutiny.208 At the same time, the Supreme
Court has squarely established that it does not regard the rationales that
underlie structural regulation as content-based.209
207. Professor Baker suggests that because the market can have as much of an adverse impact on
media content as structural regulations, market distortions should raise similar concerns under my
approach to the First Amendment. See Baker, supra note 13, at 755–759. This ignores the state action
doctrine, which represents one of the central underpinnings of classic liberal theory. See Yoo, supra
note 11, at 331–34 (describing the difficulties in reconciling democratic theories of media policy with
the state action doctrine). The role that state action plays in defining the relationship between the
individual and the state explains why adverse speech effects resulting from governmental actions might
be problematic, whereas similar effects resulting from private ordering would not.
208. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002); United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641–43; Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118 (1991); Ark.
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230–31 (1987).
209. Turner I squarely concluded that each of the three policy goals underlying structural
regulation—(1) the preservation of free, local television; (2) the promotion of a diversity of information
sources, and (3) the promotion of competition—were unrelated to the content of message conveyed.
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662. See also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 798–801
(1978) (holding that the promotion of diverse views is content-neutral).
This conclusion is far from unassailable. As noted earlier, the goal of promoting diversity is
intimately intertwined with who has the power to select, edit, and present speech. See supra note 77 and
accompanying text. Similarly, the preference for localism clearly signifies the government’s conclusion
that a particular type of speech is especially valuable. Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Turner I
vigorously disputed the conclusion that promoting diversity and localism was content-neutral. See
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 677–78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Courts that have recognized the problematic
nature of the conclusion that regulations designed to promote viewpoint diversity and localism are
content-neutral have felt constrained to follow Turner I’s resolution of the issue. See Horton v. City of
Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 192–94 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. FCC, 365 F.3d
1156, 1169–70 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that promotion of a diversity of views and localism to be contentneutral), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 634 (2004); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027,
1041–42, 1046 (D.C. Cir.) (identifying the promotion of competition, diversity, and localism as the
interests underlying the national television station ownership limits and holding them to be content-
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One line of decisions, associated with Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,210 appeared to entertain the
possibility of subjecting structural restrictions to strict scrutiny even in the
absence of facial content discrimination or content-based motive. In
Minneapolis Star, the Court expanded on a precedent invalidating a state
tax that applied only to newspapers211 and applied strict scrutiny to strike
down a generally applicable tax whose burden fell disproportionately on a
small group of newspapers. In so doing, the Court framed the issues in a
manner almost ideally suited for redressing the problems of architectural
censorship. Strict scrutiny was not limited to instances in which the
government acted out of an illicit motive.212 Instead, the Court recognized
that “even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict
unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment.”213 As a
result, any restriction “that singles out the press, or that targets individual
publications within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify
its action.”214 This language suggests that the doctrine is not designed
solely to ferret out regulations that are mere facades for suppressing speech
of a particular content or by particular speakers. Rather, Minneapolis Star
could arguably be construed as applying to economic regulation that,
though innocently enacted, has the unintended byproduct of adversely
affecting the content of speech.
The Supreme Court reinforced this line of jurisprudence in Arkansas
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,215 in which it struck down a sales tax that
exempted newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sports
journals. The Court held that the reasoning of Minneapolis Star applied a
fortiori to a tax that differentiated on its face among different types of
magazines on the basis of their content.216 Because the differential taxation
of magazines represented sufficient grounds for striking down the sales tax,
the Court declined to address whether the distinction drawn between
newspapers and magazines also violated the First Amendment.217
neutral), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002); CBS Broad., Inc. v. Echostar
Communications Corp., 265 F.3d 1193, 1210 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding the promotion of localism to be
content-neutral).
210. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
211. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
212. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592 (“Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a
violation of the First Amendment.”).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 592–93.
215. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
216. Id. at 229–30.
217. Id. at 232–33.
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The Court would soon foreclose any prospect that Minneapolis Star
and its progeny would serve as a check on architectural censorship. In
Leathers v. Medlock,218 the Court upheld a sales tax that applied to cable
television but exempted satellite television providers as well as certain
newspapers and magazines. The Court regarded the tax as a law of general
applicability that did not single out the press for differential treatment.219
The tax was not structured in a way that raised suspicions that it was
intended to fall solely on a small group of media speakers.220 Even though
the exemption for satellite television providers effectively created
differential treatment for media that were functionally similar, the fact that
the tax affected approximately one hundred cable suppliers obviated any
suggestion that it penalized any particular speaker or the expression of any
particular idea.221
The Court reaffirmed the idea that the Minneapolis Star line of
precedents only applies when a statute of general application affects a small
number of speakers in its first Turner Broadcasting decision
(“Turner I”).222 Rejecting the argument that must-carry should be subject to
strict scrutiny, the Court distinguished the Minneapolis Star line of cases
by pointing out that the restriction in question applied to large numbers of
cable systems. As a result, it “d[id] not pose the same dangers of
suppression and manipulation that were posed by the more narrowly
targeted regulations in Minneapolis Star” and its progeny.223
The limitations imposed by Leathers and Turner I drastically limit the
Minneapolis Star line of cases’ potential for redressing the problem of
architectural censorship.224 So long as the restriction in question applies to
a sufficiently large number of entities, it does not matter that it favors one
form of communication over another. The type of structural regulations that
represent the focus of this Article will almost invariably apply to a
sufficiently large number of entities to take them outside of this scope.
218. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
219. Id. at 447.
220. Id. at 448.
221. Id. at 449.
222. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
223. Id. at 661. The Court alternatively noted that differential treatment may also be “‘justified by
some special characteristic of’ the particular medium being regulated.” Id. at 660–61 (quoting
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)). The Court
concluded that the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators represented just such a
special characteristic. Id. at 661.
224. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has suggested that Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers’ Project
only apply to tax cases. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 68 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Walsh v.
Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also Benjamin, supra note 11, at 29–30.
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Indeed, Leathers and Turner I fundamentally altered the spirit of the
Minneapolis Star line of cases, in effect suggesting that differential impacts
caused by laws of general applicability only raise constitutional concerns
when they betray some indicia of a clandestine desire to suppress
expression. As such, Minneapolis Star no longer offers much promise of
addressing architectural censorship that arises from the unintended
consequences of economically motivated regulation.
C. RATIONAL BASIS VS. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
Since the Supreme Court’s foreclosure of any real possibility of
subjecting structural regulation to strict scrutiny, courts have struggled to
determine whether the proper standard should be one of rational basis or
intermediate scrutiny. The problem was presented quite nicely by the D.C.
Circuit in News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC.225 News America is the
result of a rider buried in a massive, 471-page continuing resolution
appropriating funds for the entire federal government for fiscal year
1988.226 The rider forbade the FCC from using any funds to extend any
temporary waivers to the current newspaper/television crossownership rule.
As the court noted, the statute was “general in form but not in reality.”227
At the time, only one such temporary waiver had been issued: the one held
by Rupert Murdoch that allowed him to own both WXNE-TV and the
Boston Herald.
Because this generally applicable statute had the effect of burdening a
single speaker, it appeared to represent precisely the type of provision that
would be subject to strict scrutiny under Minneapolis Star. The court
instead evaluated the constitutionality of the rider under the lower level of
First Amendment scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court to the
newspaper/broadcast crossownership rule in FCC v. National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting (“NCCB”).228 There, the Court upheld the
newspaper/broadcast crossownership rule as a “reasonable means of
promoting the public interest in diversified mass communications.”229
225. News Am. Publ’g, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
226. This is in contrast to the usual practice, in which the federal budget is enacted through a
series of thirteen appropriations acts. The continuing resolution was also unusual in that the text of the
legislation was printed only in a 1194-page conference report. See id. at 801–02.
227. Id. at 802.
228. Id. at 810–11 (citing FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978)). See
also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (applying a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny to
broadcasting to sustain the Chain Broadcasting Rules).
229. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 802.
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Other courts addressing constitutional challenges to structural regulation of
the broadcast industry have felt obligated to follow NCCB.230
Several aspects of this decision are quite problematic. NCCB was
based on the longstanding rationale that the physical scarcity of the
electromagnetic spectrum justifies conferring a lesser degree of First
Amendment protection on broadcasting than on other media.231 Over the
years, however, a stream of commentary has undermined the vitality of the
scarcity doctrine by demonstrating its analytical incoherence.232 In
addition, technological developments allowing for more intensive use of
the spectrum and the advent of cable television have lessened the extent to
which the spectrum serves as a bottleneck for transmitting media speech.
The Supreme Court seems to have backed away from the doctrine as well.
Not only has the Court declined invitations to extend it to other forms of
communication,233 its recent decisions raise serious questions as to its
continuing vitality even with respect to broadcasting.234
230. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 401–02 (3d Cir. 2004); Sinclair Broad.
Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280
F.3d 1027, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). See also Sinclair
Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 172 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at
13,625–27 ¶¶ 13–16. As the D.C. Circuit noted in another case involving the newspaper/broadcast
crossownership rule, “We are stuck with the scarcity doctrine until the day that the Supreme Court tells
us that the Red Lion no longer rules the broadcast jungle.” Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
231. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 799. The scarcity doctrine has its roots in the
seminal decision on broadcast regulation, NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226–27 (1943), and has
been reaffirmed many times since then. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566–67 (1990),
overruled on other grounds by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 374–77 (1984); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394–96
(1981); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101–02 (1973); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1969).
232. The academic criticism of the constitutionality of the scarcity doctrine is voluminous. See
generally Yoo, supra note 11, at 266–92 (reviewing and extending the leading critiques of scarcity).
Tellingly, even proponents of broadcast regulation no longer attempt to defend the scarcity doctrine.
See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 87–90 (1991); SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 110;
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children’s Television
Programming, 45 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1247 (1996); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A
New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687,
1701–05 (1997); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1993).
233. The Supreme Court has rejected attempts to extend the broadcast regime to the mail,
telephony, and the Internet. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (Internet); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (telephony); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 10 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion) (mail); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (mail); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 542–
43 (1980) (mail). But see Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 974–77 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(extending the broadcast rationale to DBS). For a time, the Court appeared to entertain the possibility of
extending the broadcast justification to cable television. Compare Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 637–39
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In addition, this broad reading of NCCB is hard to square with Turner
I, which rejected extending the Court’s broadcast precedents to cable
television. Notwithstanding the Court’s acknowledgement of other courts’
and commentators’ criticisms of the scarcity doctrine’s analytical
coherence,235 the Court declined to revisit the applicability of the scarcity
doctrine to broadcasting in a case that did not properly present the issue.236
Because cable does not depend on the broadcast spectrum, it does not
suffer from the “inherent limitations” and “danger of physical interference”
that supposedly confront broadcasting.237 At the same time, the Court held
that “laws that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special
treatment” must be subject to some measure of heightened scrutiny.238 As a
result, the Court followed a line of D.C. Circuit cases239 and concluded that
the proper standard was the level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech as announced in
United States v. O’Brien.240 Unlike the NCCB standard, which is stated in
(1994) (rejecting the application of the broadcast regime to uphold must-carry), with Denver Area Educ.
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737–48, 755 (1996) (plurality opinion) (suggesting
that Turner I did not foreclose applying the broadcast regime to uphold behavioral regulation of cable
television). This possibility was subsequently foreclosed by the Court’s decision in United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–14 (2000) (5-4 decision).
234. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have avoided reliance on the traditional justifications
and have instead turned to other doctrines to justify holding the regulation under review to a lower level
of First Amendment scrutiny. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999) (commercial speech); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (public
forum doctrine); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (commercial speech).
235. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 638 & n.5.
236. Id. at 638 (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376, n.11 (1984)).
237. Id. at 638–39.
238. Id. at 640–41.
239. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 298–304 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(invalidating revised must-carry regulations), clarified by 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Quincy Cable
TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454–62 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (invalidating initial must-carry regulations);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 14, 48–50 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (invalidating regulations
restricting pay television). The must-carry decisions did not formally decide that O’Brien provided the
appropriate basis for evaluating the constitutionality of must-carry. Because the courts concluded that
the restrictions under review failed the more lenient level of scrutiny announced in O’Brien, they found
it unnecessary to resolve whether the regulations should be subjected to a more stringent standard of
review, such as strict scrutiny. See Century Communications, 835 F.2d at 298; Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d
at 1448, 1450–54.
240. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 661–62 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). Turner I
thus represented the culmination of a fairly remarkable transformation of O’Brien doctrine. Originally
applicable only to general regulations that had a tangential impact on speech, following Turner I,
O’Brien doctrine is now applicable to direct regulations of speech so long as they are content-neutral.
For an insightful discussion of pre-Turner I cases applying O’Brien to direct restrictions of speech, see
Keith Werhan, The O’Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 649–58 (1988).
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terms reminiscent of rational basis,241 the O’Brien standard employs
language that suggests an intermediate level of scrutiny.242
The language in Turner I holding that all regulations targeting a
certain element of the press were necessarily subject to some form of
heightened scrutiny seems to apply with equal force to structural regulation
imposed on broadcasting. Courts have struggled to reconcile these two
precedents. Some courts have attempted to rely on a technology-based
distinction, applying the NCCB standard to the structural regulation of
broadcasting,243 while applying the Turner I standard to structural
regulation of the cable industry.244 They point out that, although Turner I
acknowledged the analytical deficiencies with the scarcity doctrine, it
explicitly declined to question its continuing validity with respect to
broadcasting.245
Attempts to draw technology-based distinctions suffer from severe
analytical problems. Most obviously, they do not provide a basis for
determining the appropriate standard of review to be applied to
crossownership of broadcast and nonbroadcast media. Indeed, the FCC’s
2003 Biennial Review Order recognizes the conundrum posed by
crossownership restrictions. Although the FCC maintains that
241. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
242. Specifically, O’Brien requires that the restriction in question “further[] an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The first prong focuses on the
constitutional authority to impose the regulation rather than the First Amendment. The third prong is the
equivalent of a threshold inquiry into whether the restriction is content-based. The remaining two
prongs, which require a “substantial government interest” that is “no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest,” are analogous to classic intermediate scrutiny. See Michael C. Dorf,
Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1202 (1996); Srikanth
Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Motive-Based Rationalization
of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401, 404 (1995).
243. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 167–69 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1046–47 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537
(D.C. Cir. 2002).
244. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1129–30 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Time
Warner Entm’t Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1316–19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Time Warner Entm’t
Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 966–67, 967–73, 978–79 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC,
56 F.3d 151, 181–86 (D.C. Cir. 1995); US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1100–06 (9th Cir.
1995) (striking down cable/telephone company crossownership), vacated and remanded, 516 U.S. 1155
(1996).
245. See Sinclair Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 161–62; Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1046.
Cf. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 402 (3d Cir. 2004).
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crossownership restrictions will be subject only to rational basis scrutiny, it
acknowledges that because they
[w]ill limit the speech opportunities not only for broadcasters, but also
for other entities that may seek to own and operate broadcast outlets
(including those with the fullest First Amendment protection—
newspapers), we should draw the rule as narrowly as possible in order to
serve our public interest goals while imposing the least possible burden
on the freedom of expression.246

At the same time, the FCC acknowledged the possible relevance of the
cable precedents by ensuring that the crossownership rules are “narrowly
tailored.”247
The distinction between broadcast and nonbroadcast media is likely to
be clouded still further by the growing functional similarity between
different television technologies.248 For example, television broadcasters
are now in a position to use the enhanced efficiency made possible by
digital transmission to begin to provide multichannel service.249 In
addition, the emergence of DBS systems, such as DirecTV and the Dish
Network, has rendered spectrum-based and wireline television technologies
largely interchangeable. As a result, it would seem quite strange to subject
functionally identical technologies to drastically different First Amendment
standards. Indeed, courts have reacted with some confusion as to the proper
standard of review to be applied to DBS regulations. While some courts
have applied the more lenient broadcast standard to DBS, other courts have
246. 2003 Biennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 13,793 ¶ 441.
247. Id. at 13,798 ¶ 455 & n.988 (citing Time Warner, 240 F.3d at 1135). Courts have largely
been able to avoid addressing the merits of this issue. On a few occasions, it arose in the context of the
newspaper/broadcast crossownership restrictions and thus was squarely controlled by NCCB. See
Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998). When the issue arose in the context of the
cable/broadcast crossownership rule, the D.C. Circuit was able to avoid the issue by disposing of it on
statutory grounds. See Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1049. The only court that attempted to
reconcile the ambiguity created by these competing standards of review held that the heightened
scrutiny mandated by Turner I applied only when a regulation singles out a subclass of broadcasters and
did not apply to regulations imposing obligations on broadcasters as a whole. See Sinclair Broad.
Group, 284 F.3d at 168. This resolution is inconsistent with Turner I, which concluded that heightened
scrutiny is applicable to any laws that “single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special
treatment.” Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994). Indeed, Turner I’s limitation of Minneapolis Star to
cases in which regulations single out small numbers of media speakers suggests that the distinction
identified in Sinclair Broadcasting is better suited to identifying situations subject to strict scrutiny than
to determining whether to apply rational basis or intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 659–61.
248. See Yoo, supra note 45, at 227–29.
249. See id. at 213, 227.
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subjected structural regulation of DBS to the higher level of scrutiny
mandated by Turner I.250
Even courts that agree that NCCB provides the appropriate First
Amendment standard have expressed confusion over the proper way to
apply that standard of review. Some courts have construed NCCB as
holding that structural regulation of the broadcast industry is subject only to
rational basis scrutiny.251 Other courts have construed NCCB as requiring
them to apply intermediate scrutiny.252 Still others have applied a standard
of review that falls somewhere in between.253 Thus, even if one were to
settle on the particular constitutional standard to be applied, considerable
confusion would remain as to precisely what that standard requires.
D. APPLYING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ultimately, it may not matter precisely how this dispute is resolved.
This is because even the most stringent of these tests—intermediate
scrutiny under O’Brien—has long been criticized as too deferential. As
noted earlier, the heart of the O’Brien standard requires that the restriction
250. Compare Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975–77 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying
the more lenient broadcast standard to sustain a statute requiring a DBS provider to set aside channel
capacity for “noncommercial programming of an educational or informational nature” (citation
omitted)), with Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 352–66 (4th Cir.
2001) (applying the intermediate scrutiny of Turner I to sustain a statute requiring satellite broadcasters
to carry local stations). These precedents cannot be squared with either the Supreme Court’s broadcast
or cable precedents. Under the broadcast precedents, one would have expected structural regulation of
DBS to be subject to rational basis scrutiny under NCCB and behavioral regulation to be subject to
intermediate scrutiny under League of Women Voters. See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad.,
436 U.S. 775 (1978); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984). Because Satellite
Broadcasting & Communications Ass’n applied intermediate scrutiny to structural regulation, these
cases do not place DBS within the broadcast paradigm. Under the Supreme Court’s cable precedents,
one would have expected structural regulation of DBS to be subject to intermediate scrutiny under
Turner I and behavioral regulation to be subject to strict scrutiny under United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813–15 (2000). Because Time Warner applied something less
than strict scrutiny to behavioral regulation, see Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 975, these cases fall outside
the cable paradigm as well.
251. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 401–02 (3d Cir. 2004); Sinclair
Broad. Group, 284 F.3d at 167–68. Cf. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1046–47
(D.C. Cir.) (limiting heightened scrutiny to content-based restrictions on broadcast speech while
holding that structural regulations were subject only to “deferential review”), modified on reh’g, 293
F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
252. See, e.g., News Am. Publ’g, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See also
Benjamin, supra note 11, at 54–64 (arguing that broadcast regulation is subject to intermediate
scrutiny).
253. See Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 243–45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that more
than minimal rationality is required when a structural regulation has the effect of completely prohibiting
an individual from using a particular communications medium).
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“further[] an important or substantial governmental interest” and that “the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [be] no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”254 The requirement that
the regulation further a “substantial” governmental interest has been
construed to require only that the interest be nontrivial without requiring it
to be particularly significant.255 Any lack of substantiality can also be
obviated by raising the level of generality until the requirement is met.256
O’Brien’s tailoring requirement has proven to be equally permissive.
Although initially stated in somewhat restrictive terms, the Court has
subsequently reinterpreted it to be satisfied whenever the underlying
government interest “would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.”257 This reconstruction of the tailoring requirement represents a
comparison of the various means available to the government, rather than
an inquiry into whether the strength of the government interest justifies the
intrusion on individual liberty. As a result, O’Brien doctrine devolves into a
regulatory inquiry focusing solely on the extent to which the means chosen
promote the government’s goals.258
The result is a level of scrutiny that has been repeatedly criticized as
tantamount to the presumption of nonprotection associated with rational
basis review,259 reaching only “laws that engage in the gratuitous inhibition
of expression.”260 Unless O’Brien scrutiny is given more bite,261 it is of
little practical consequence whether any particular instance of structural
regulation is formally subject to rational basis scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, or something in between.262
254. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 397 (1968).
255. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case,
1968 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23.
256. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1486 n.17 (1975); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 51 (1987).
257. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985))).
258. Werhan, supra note 240, at 672. Werhan further notes, “There is no speech side to the
Court’s balance. The Justices assess only the operational efficiency of the government’s regulatory
agenda, avoiding any consideration of whether that program is ‘commensurably more important’ than
the [F]irst [A]mendment values advanced by the expression at issue.” Id. at 641–42 (footnote omitted).
259. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 200, at 787–88; Stone, supra note 256, at 50–52.
260. Ely, supra note 256, at 1485–86.
261. See infra Part III.B (exploring this possibility).
262. Professor Baker argues that evaluating the constitutionality of structural regulation on the
basis of the rationales proffered by the FCC risks overlooking the true rationales underlying structural
regulations and their most important effects. See Baker, supra note 13, at 759–760. The Supreme
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III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF
ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP
Thus, First Amendment doctrine does not appear to provide for
meaningful judicial review of architectural censorship. This Part explores
two possible solutions to this problem. First, it entertains the possibility of
leaving matters unchanged and relying on Congress and the FCC to protect
against architectural censorship. Second, it explores the possibility of
revising O’Brien doctrine to allow for more meaningful judicial review.
A. RELIANCE ON THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
One alternative is to leave the responsibility for protecting against the
dangers of architectural censorship squarely in the hands of the political
branches. A long and distinguished heritage offers support for such a
proposal. Indeed, the authority of each coordinate branch to interpret the
Constitution has been endorsed by such historical luminaries as James
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Daniel Webster, Stephen
Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and Felix Frankfurter,263 as well as by a
veritable “all-star list of constitutional law scholars.”264 Such a claim might
seem somewhat jarring to those steeped in the ringing declaration of
Marbury v. Madison265 that “[i]t is empathically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”266 To say, however, that the
courts have authority to construe the Constitution is not to say that they
have the exclusive authority to do so. Indeed, Marbury is based on the
Court’s adoption of the “substantial evidence” test in Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994), would seem
to justify focusing solely on the rationales and factual inferences that were before Congress and the
FCC, and would limit reviewing courts to assessing the goals and the means asserted by the
government.
263. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–26
(1992); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21–28 (11th ed. 1985); WALTER F. MURPHY,
JAMES E. FLEMING & WILLIAM F. HARRIS, II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 195–247
(1986); Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Authority of the Judiciary’s Interpretation of
the Constitution, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 771, 777–82 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman
Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 84–
97 (1993).
264. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 49 n.26 (1993) (noting that Alexander Bickel, Edward Corwin, Philip
Kurland, Gerald Gunther, Henry Monaghan, and Herbert Wechsler had each endorsed the authority of
all three coordinate branches to interpret the Constitution). See generally Steven G. Calabresi &
Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1451, 1463–72 (1997) (providing an overview of the debate on coordinate construction).
265. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
266. Id. at 177.
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premise that “[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule.”267 Legislators and executive
branch officials routinely apply the Constitution to particular factual
contexts. Thus, in firmly establishing the judiciary’s right to interpret the
Constitution, Marbury implicitly recognized the other branches’ authority
to do so as well.268
The fact that Congress and the executive branch are competent to
interpret and enforce the Constitution does not necessarily justify leaving
important issues of constitutional interpretation exclusively in their hands.
The judiciary bears an obligation to exercise its independent constitutional
judgment even when other branches are in a position to offer their own
assessment of the constitutionality of a particular governmental action.269
From this perspective, allowing instances of architectural censorship to
evade meaningful judicial scrutiny would represent a disturbing abdication
of responsibility.
Whether the political branches will prove particularly effective in
protecting against the dangers of architectural censorship is also
questionable. Members of Congress are typically loath to consider
constitutional issues. As Abner Mikva, who as a judge and former member
of the House of Representatives was uniquely well situated to comment on
the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature on matters of
constitutional interpretation, once observed, “The fastest way to empty out
the chamber [of Congress] is to get up and say, ‘I’d like to talk about the
constitutionality of this bill.’ Members of Congress believe that’s what
courts are for.”270 Agencies are often equally reluctant to address
constitutional issues,271 as has been the case for the FCC.272
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-2, at 25 (2d ed. 1988);
Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21
GA. L. REV. 57, 63 (1986); Merrill, supra note 264, at 51; William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 37 (1969).
269. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 129 (1989); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843–44 (1978).
270. Linda Greenhouse, What’s a Lawmaker to Do About the Constitution?, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
1988, at B6. See also Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,
61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983) (arguing that Congress should do more to discover constitutional
shortcomings in legislation).
271. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (noting that “adjudication of the
constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of
administrative agencies” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Henry P. Monaghan, First
Amendment “Due Process”, 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1970) (describing how agencies can suffer
from “institutional ‘tunnel vision’” that makes them more likely to frame questions of speech in terms
of the regulatory issues with which they have been charged than in terms of the First Amendment).
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B. INTENSIFYING O’BRIEN SCRUTINY
The other alternative is to refine First Amendment doctrine to give the
courts a larger role in reviewing instances of architectural censorship. A
plurality of the Supreme Court in Turner I experimented with this option
when it incorporated into O’Brien scrutiny the requirement that the “recited
harms [be] real, not merely nonconjectural, and that the regulation . . .
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”273 To determine
whether legislative findings satisfied this requirement, the Court balanced
two opposing considerations. On the one hand was the fact that the
legislative branch is better suited institutionally to make predictive
judgments and is not required to produce the kind of record generally
required of administrative agencies.274 On the other hand was the
recognition that blanket deference to legislative findings would constitute
abdication of the judiciary’s role in protecting the Constitution. To balance
these two considerations, the Court borrowed the administrative law
principle requiring the government to have “drawn reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence.”275
The overall thrust of this development led many commentators to
speculate whether the addition of this requirement would turn O’Brien
scrutiny into a more meaningful form of judicial review.276 Historically,
courts have been quite reluctant to second guess the evidentiary findings
made by Congress and the FCC. As the Court has noted, its “opinions have
repeatedly emphasized that the Commission’s judgment regarding how the
public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial deference.”277
On other occasions, the Court has been slightly more circumspect,
declining to “defer” to the other branches, but nonetheless “afford[ing]
272. For example, the FCC initially declined to repeal the Fairness Doctrine notwithstanding
serious doubts as to its constitutionality. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and
Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 145, 147 ¶ 6, 148–57 ¶¶ 8–21, 246–47- ¶¶ 175–176 (1985), vacated sub nom. RadioTelevision News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 831 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The FCC’s refusal to address the
issue drew a sharp rebuke from the D.C. Circuit, which chided, “we are aware of no precedent that
permits a federal agency to ignore a constitutional challenge to the application of its own policy merely
because the resolution would be politically awkward.” Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
273. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993)).
274. Id. at 665–66.
275. Id. at 666.
276. See Dorf, supra note 242, at 1201 n.101; Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment
Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1263 n.67 (1995).
277. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (citing FCC v. Nat’l Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978)). See also FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946).
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great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the
Commission” and “pay[ing] careful attention to how the other branches of
Government have addressed the same problem” when confronted with “a
complex problem with many hard questions and few easy answers.”278
There are some indications that the Court may now be willing to
engage in more searching scrutiny of the factual predicate underlying
statutory enactments. For example, the Court has shown its willingness to
scrutinize the sufficiency of the evidentiary record in other contexts,
including the Commerce Clause,279 warrantless searches under the Fourth
Amendment,280 and most notably Congress’s exercise of its authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.281 The Court’s willingness to rely
on the absence of a real, nonconjectural harm to strike down restrictions of
commercial speech also makes this argument quite plausible.282 Indeed,
shortly thereafter, various courts invoked this consideration to invalidate a
number of restrictions on the cable industry.283 Some courts have seen in
Turner I the emergence of a stricter standard, one that will govern all
content-neutral regulations that discriminate amongst the media.284
Subsequent developments have substantially reduced the likelihood
that the factual review announced by the Turner I plurality will
278. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102–03 (1973). Accord Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 569 (1990) (quoting and following the above-quoted language from CBS),
overruled on other grounds, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
279. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614–18 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995).
280. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318–22 (1997).
281. See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368–72 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 88–90 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–32 (1997). But see Nev. Dep’t
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729–40 (2003) (sustaining the sufficiency of the legislative
record underlying the Family and Medical Leave Act).
282. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489–91 (1995); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus.
& Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 144–49 (1994); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771–73 (1993);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626, 648–49 (1985). See also
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 476–77 (1995).
283. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (invalidating cable
broadcast crossownership rule); Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that
summary judgment was granted in error in evaluating the fee charged on non-locally produced cable
programs); US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating the
cable/telephone company crossownership ban), vacated and remanded, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996);
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994) (same), vacated, 516
U.S. 415 (1996); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1994)
(invalidating the issuance of an exclusive cable franchise). See also Comcast Cablevision of Broward
County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (stating in dicta that ordinance
requiring open access to cable modem systems would have failed intermediate scrutiny).
284. See Netanel, supra note 201, at 55–58.
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significantly check architectural censorship. When the Court restated these
principles in its second Turner decision (“Turner II”), it employed a far
different tone. Noticeably missing from the opinion was any reference to
judicial exercise of “independent judgment” or inquiry into whether the
harm was “nonconjectural.” Instead, the language and the structure of the
opinion emphasized deference.285 Later decisions have raised further
doubts as to whether Turner I’s imposition of a substantial evidence
requirement will actually lead to more searching judicial review. In Nixon
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,286 the Court noted that “[t]he
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial
scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and
plausibility of the justification raised.”287 In particular, the Court
acknowledged the possibility, first noted by the plurality opinion in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,288 that the government could rely on a
factual record developed in another context or jurisdiction so long as the
evidence on which the record is based is reasonably believed to be
relevant.289 A plurality of the Court reaffirmed this position in City of Erie
v. Pap’s A.M.,290 concluding that the City of Erie could rely on the
evidentiary foundations laid out in Renton291 and Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.292
285. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 199 (1997). See also Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First
Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 935, 937–38 (1998) (noting that “[w]ithout a
doubt, the Court’s decision in Turner II undercut what many thought to be the effect of Turner I” and
lamenting the opportunity to engage in meaningful scrutiny of the relationship between ends and
means). For an excellent analysis of the differences between Turner I and Turner II, see Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 301–03 (2000).
286. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
287. Id. It bears noting that this language is clearly dicta. After noting this possibility, the Court
explicitly acknowledged the existence of a sufficient factual basis. Id. at 393–94.
288. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986).
289. Shrink Mo. Gov’t., 528 U.S. at 393 n.6.
290. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296–97 (2000) (plurality opinion).
291. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50–51 (relying on the factual record recited in a decision of the
Supreme Court of Washington upholding a restriction on nude dancing in Seattle).
292. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 & n.34 (1976) (plurality opinion). Even
more disturbing is the suggestion that the City of Erie’s invocation of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), would have been sufficient alone to sustain the
restriction under review. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 297. As Justice Souter noted in dissent, the
plurality opinion in Barnes did not purport to rely on any factual evidence indicating the existence of a
problem. Id. at 315 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Permitting a mere citation of
Barnes to satisfy Turner I’s substantial evidence requirement would effectively gut the substantial
evidence standard and would condone a form of constitutional bootstrapping that would be quite
unprincipled.
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In any event, even if the substantial evidence requirement advanced by
the Turner I plurality survives as a basis for more searching scrutiny under
the O’Brien standard, it is unlikely to redress the type of architectural
censorship discussed in this Article. Commentators have long regarded
O’Brien doctrine as uncovering restrictions driven by an improper
government motive.293 Indeed, the search for illicit purpose best supports
putting the government to its proof in the manner dictated by Turner I.294
As such, adding this element is unlikely to bear on architectural
censorship, which is generally the unintended byproduct of truly innocent
governmental actions.295 Even under this invigorated form, O’Brien
scrutiny would do little to balance the importance of the governmental
interest asserted vis-à-vis the individual’s interest to engage in speech. Nor
would it lead courts to inquire whether alternative avenues of
communication exist or whether the same goals could be accomplished in a
less intrusive manner. Architectural censorship would be better addressed
through a test focusing on a regulation’s effects on speech. Such tests,
however, are generally disfavored, largely due to concerns that employing
an effects test would open an unacceptably large swath of governmental
action to constitutional scrutiny.296
293. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585, 590 (1975) (suggesting that the real teaching of O’Brien, despite the Court’s
contrary language, was that “some motives are unconstitutional”); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public
Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413,
438–42, 491–505 (1996) (arguing that O’Brien is primarily designed to expose regulations animated by
improper governmental motives); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV.
767, 775–76 (2001) (concluding that “the O’Brien test itself is centrally concerned with legislative
purpose, despite the Court’s protests to the contrary”); Srinivasan, supra note 242, at 420 (synthesizing
the Court’s jurisprudence on incidental restrictions on speech as focusing on “a concern with speechsuppressive administrative motivation”). Interestingly, this reading of O’Brien is inconsistent with
O’Brien itself, which disavowed that it was designed to identify illicit legislative motive. See United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–83 (1968).
294. See Netanel, supra note 201, at 61–62 (arguing that the invigorated intermediate scrutiny of
Turner I is designed to root out improper governmental motive).
295. See Redish, supra note 200, at 130–31 (concluding that content-neutral regulations enacted
without illicit motives can nonetheless skew speech markets in impermissible ways); Stone, supra note
256, at 106–07 (observing that properly motivated regulations may still have an adverse incidental
impact on speech); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 615, 658 (1991) (noting that “even regulations serving a noncommunicative purpose can have a
discriminatory effect on the speech market available to would-be listeners”).
296. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 84–86 (1997); Dorf, supra note 242, at 1178; Schauer, supra note
200, at 784, 790. Cf. Kagan, supra note 293, at 413–14 (criticizing the effects tests).

YOOBAKE19.DOC

2005]

3/28/2005 4:30 PM

ARCHITECTURAL CENSORSHIP

731

CONCLUSION
The analysis advanced in this Article demonstrates that the current
debate has taken a far too simplistic approach to the impact that media
ownership rules can have on television and radio program content. The
analysis set forth reveals that the relationship between structural regulation
and media content is much more complex than is generally recognized.
Even worse, the current regulatory regime has all too often unintentionally
degraded the quantity, quality, and diversity of programming available. In
other words, structural regulation can represent a form of architectural
censorship that can reduce the quantity, quality, and diversity of media
programming. Unfortunately, current First Amendment doctrine effectively
immunizes architectural censorship from meaningful constitutional
scrutiny. As a result, either Congress or the FCC must bear the primary
responsibility for safeguarding free speech values against these dangers, or
the courts must revise O’Brien doctrine to permit more searching review
capable of protecting the important speech interests at stake. Neither
outcome appears likely at this point.
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